Religion, Politics, and the Construction of Ethnic Identity in Macao

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the role religion plays in the construction of ethnic identity in Macao's multiethnic society. There are three main ethnic groups: the Chinese, the Macanese and the Portuguese, and ethnic differentiation largely coincides with distinct religious affiliation. In such a context, I was interested in finding out whether, and how, religion was being deployed to differentiate ethnic groups and reinforce a sense of belonging. The political dimension inherent to the construction of an ethnic identity led me to include in my analysis the nature of the relationship between religion and political power. This is thus a study of the interrelationship of religion, politics and ethnicity in Macao.

Since ethnicity is here perceived as a dynamic process, I combine an anthropological approach with an historical contextualization. I demonstrate how changing political, social and economic factors have affected the role played by religion in the drawing of ethnic boundaries. In the first part—Catholic religion, it is argued that religion used to constitute the criterion chosen by the colonial government to erect ethnic boundaries and legitimate its ruling position. Since the 1970's, though, religion lost its appeal as a cultural marker due to political changes and the process of localization of the Church among other factors. Chinese converts are no longer required to renounce the cultural markers of their own ethnic identity; conversion being therefore now socially regarded as the result of an individual option.

In the second part I analyze Chinese popular religion, concentrating on public practices, more precisely on temple management and temple activities. I focus on a decaying neighborhood temple (Kun Iam Ku Miu), and on a prospering major temple (Kun Iam Tong), which are illustrative of the present situation in Macao. The role of neighborhood temples as the center of community activities has diminish. Furthermore neighborhood affiliation lost its relevance and these temples no longer fulfill the needs of the population, their future being therefore in jeopardy. On the other hand, major temples like the Kun Iam Tong, came to symbolize a territory-wide identity. Their appeal as a symbol of a pan-Macao identity has enabled them to prosper.

I contend that in Macao the engagement of the Chinese population in ritual practices has had the largely unintended sociological effect of reproducing social solidarity and therefore, of promoting the cohesion of the Chinese community. By enabling the expression of a Chinese identity, it also differentiates Chinese from non-Chinese. On the other hand, Catholic religion, although drawn upon to establish a boundary between Christians and non-Christians, never enabled the emergence of a cohesive community.

To conclude, ethnic identities are contextual constructions. Religion has been losing its role as the tool to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness that it had throughout Macao's colonial history. With the transfer of sovereignty in 1999, "Macao people" will resort to new cultural markers to maintain a specific identity, distinct from the Mainland Chinese.

Romanization

Names of places, persons, and organizations in Macao are written using the Cantonese romanization used in Macao. Other Cantonese terms are romanized according to the Yale system. The Pinyin transcription system was also used between parentheses when deemed necessary. The glossary at the end provides the written Chinese.

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PART 1

CATHOLIC RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Research Object and Methodology

This is a study of the role religion plays in the construction of ethnic identity in Macao. When I first decided to analyze how religion could be deployed to build ethnic boundaries, Macao seemed, for several reasons, the ideal place to carry out this research. First, it is a multiethnic society. Broadly speaking there are three main ethnic groups, the Chinese, the Macanese[1] and the Portuguese. Second, ethnic differentiation largely coincides with distinct religious affiliation. The majority of the Chinese population practices Chinese popular religion, while the majority of the Portuguese and Macanese are practicing or nominal Catholics. In such a context, I was interested in finding out whether religion was being deployed to differentiate ethnic groups and reinforce a sense of belongingness or, on the contrary, religious affiliation was considered to pertain to the level of individual choice with no implications whatsoever on each person's ethnic identity.

Ethnicity has a political dimension—when it comes to the construction of ethnic identity, political power may play an important role in determining which set of criteria differentiates one ethnic group from another. This is the case in Macao where powerful institutions have been involved in the way religion is drawn upon to establish ethnic boundaries. I therefore included in my research the analysis of the nature of the relationship between religion and political power, namely between the Portuguese government and the Catholic Church and between the government and the leaders of the Chinese temples. I also focused on the relations between the Chinese authorities and the leaders of the temples. This is thus a study of how religion, politics and ethnicity intermingle in Macao.

Among several social markers that groups can resort to in order to differentiate themselves, religion is a particularly interesting one because it is frequently used and shows a degree of flexibility that other social markers lack.[2] A number of works have shown that religion is frequently employed and manipulated as an ethnic criterion that serves political ends. For example, Ben Rafael and Sharot (1987) argue that in Israel, where Jews from different geographical origins have heterogeneous religious

practices, a standard prayer style was adopted by state institutions for public ceremonies in order to promote a common Jewish identity. Another example is the case of the Hmong Cambodian minority converting to Catholicism in order to differentiate themselves from the Buddhist Khmer majority (Tapp 1989).[3]

The dynamic feature of ethnicity implies that a study of the process of ethnic construction cannot be limited to the analysis of the present situation. This would lead to a distorted conception of ethnicity as something static. It is necessary not only to focus on the present situation but also to inscribe it in the historical continuum. I therefore decided to combine an anthropological approach with an historical perspective that would allow me to understand how the changes in the political, social, and economic spheres have led to transformations in the role played by religion in the construction of ethnic identity. Religion and ethnicity are thus studied as evolving social phenomena.

Until now very few scholars have concentrated their research in Macao. In what concerns religion and ethnicity, the subjects I am concerned with, very little has been done. In terms of the presence of the Catholic Church in the territory several works have been published. They constitute, for the most part, historical studies or detailed descriptive accounts (Teixeira[4] 1940 and 1969; Silva Rego 1968; Carmo 1993). Studies on Chinese popular religion in Macao are even scarcer. A few articles were published, most of which are of an ethnographic nature; they usually describe the architectural features of a specific temple and tell the story of the god to which the temple is devoted. For example, Teixeira (1982), Porter (1990), and Stevens (1980) studied various temples of Macao while Amaro focused on the history of the Kun Iam Ku Miu (*Guan Yin Gu Miao*) (1967). Brito Peixoto (1988) wrote on the legend of A Mà (Mazu) and the religious beliefs and practices of the boat people in Macao.

Some works have been published concerning the issue of ethnicity. However, the Macanese constitute the only ethnic group that has been object of in depth research. There are the works of Amaro (1988 and 1991), that consist basically in an analysis of the Macanese from a physical anthropology standpoint. This scholar has also published several articles that provide interesting ethnographic data on the Macanese community. More valuable though, are a series of articles and one book co-authored

by Pina Cabral and Nelson Lourenço that provide an in depth analysis of the Macanese community and demonstrate how political, economic and social changes have affected the way in which they construct their ethnic identity.

In general though, we could say that Macao constitutes a cultural and geographic region that has been largely ignored in the academic literature. Macao cannot be dismissed as being generally similar to Hong Kong or any other region. Its idiosyncrasy deserves the attention of researchers. In the last decades we have witnessed a concentration of work in Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, experts on Chinese culture have only to gain from the enlargement of the geographical field.

This study modestly attempts to reverse the tendency to overlook this specific territory. The practical objective is to contribute information on Macao and to provide a better understanding of how the distinct ethnic communities that coexist in Macao construct their ethnic identity. The theoretical significance of this research is an improved understanding of the role religion plays in the construction of ethnic identity and how this can be manipulated by political powers. It contributes to the literature on issues of ethnicity, religion, and identity construction. Furthermore, it also provides useful data for cross-cultural comparisons with, for example, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. This is the first study specifically conceived to research the relationship between religion and ethnic identity in Macao.

I conducted fieldwork in Macao from September 1994 until January 1995. During this period, I held in depth interviews with more than fifty persons, including temple leaders and workers, monks, worshippers, catholic priests, members of different religious congregations, people working in the diocese, converts, presidents of residents associations (kaifong/*jiefang*) and members of the administration. I also conducted a survey among worshippers of one temple (the Kun Iam Tong/ *Guan Yin Tang*), interviewing sixty persons. During the four months of the research I attended religious activities and spent several hours making observations in both the temples and social welfare institutions run by the Catholic Church.

Another procedure adopted for the collection of data consisted in the review of written sources such as the collection of the government publications (among which the *Boletim Oficial de Macau*, equivalent to the *Hong Kong Government Gazette*)

and the consultation of archival records in the Central Library and in the Historical Archives.

Definition of the Main Concepts

Religion and ethnic identity are the core concepts that structured this research. To understand ethnic identity, it is necessary to acknowledge that ontological foundations are vital for both individuals and social groups. Every member of society needs an identity that confers a place in the historical continuum as well as in society. Previous works in anthropology portrayed identity as something fixed, rigid: a sort of label that is conferred to individuals and social groups. However, recent research has shown that identity is a far more complex subject (Barth 1969; De Vos 1975a; Honig 1992).. It should be regarded in a dynamic way, as something that is being continuously reiterated as well as negotiated. Moreover it is a malleable construction—each individual has different layers of identity that he manipulates according to the goals he wants to achieve. To regard identity as something that is manipulated implies taking into consideration human agency. However, as Dominguez argues, "the individual exercise of choice takes place within socio-historical environments that deem only certain kinds of choices possible" (Dominguez 1986:9).

Furthermore, since identity does not exist without public affirmation, it is better conceived as a social construction. "Social identities are simply not who we are genetically nor how we as individuals think about ourselves. They are, I contend, conceptions of the self, constructed in time and place both epistemologically and socially in opposition to other selves" (ibid.:10). It is in the contact with others that we formulate our social identity but also that we run the risk of loosing it, of being incorporated into the "other." Therefore the awareness of proximity and difference may cause certain social markers to be strengthened and to become emblematic. However, as De Vos argues, "the use of contrast is not so much dictated by geographic proximity as by the nature of the contact with another group. In identity maintenance one has to use the nature of the possible threat which close contact with an alien group implies" (1975a: 368). In the context of colonial societies the danger

of being assimilated and therefore loosing a previous identity is particularly high. There are, however, different constructions of identity deriving from different colonial experiences and responses to colonization.

Ethnicity is one of the most important forms of social identity. It was formerly conceptualized as consisting of a shared cultural heritage—mainly in terms of language and so-called traditions. However, recent works have showed that there are no essential characteristics common to all ethnic groups, and therefore it is impractical to use substantive cultural or linguistic criteria to define them. Since no feature inherently represents an ethnic marker we should focus on the ethnic boundaries—it is these boundaries, and not the cultural content they enclose, that defines the group (see Barth 1969; De Vos 1975a; Wu 1990). So what we must examine is how and why these boundaries are maintained. "The boundaries are maintained by ascription from within as well as from external sources which differ in content depending on the history of contact of the groups involved" (De Vos 1975a:6).

Ethnicity is better conceived as a process rather than as an objective thing. As Honig puts it, ethnicity "involves the creation, invocation, and manipulation of notions of cultural distinctiveness to establish self/other dichotomies among people in a shared political and economic system. Language, race, historical experience, and geographic origins are among the myriad attributes that may be drawn on to create such boundaries, but it must be underlined that what constitutes a different or distinct language, religion, race, history, or place of origin is entirely malleable" (1992:8).

In this work, I follow recent anthropological works that regard ethnic identity as being essentially subjective and dialectical, a sense of belonging to a particular group defined by some real or imaginative traits that vary according to the context within which the formation of this identity takes place and the boundary it is intended to preserve or create.

In the last decades there has been an ongoing debate on the notion of *religion*. A quick look at the literature on this subject suffices to show that this term has become too polysemous and malleable, which raises the question of whether it can serve any

analytical purpose. There seems to be a consensus among scholars that the use of the concept of religion in Asian contexts is problematic (Pas 1979; Feuchtwang 1991; Demerath 1994).

For example, a dogmatic claim of truth is considered a prominent feature of proselytizing religions such as Catholicism. However, people engaged in Chinese religious practices do not have such an exclusivist perception of "truth." The syncretic attitude displayed by the Chinese is not something recent. On the contrary, a quick look through the literature on Chinese religion shows that there has been a long tradition of "acculturation" of "imported" religions. This was the case with Buddhism, a religion that had its origin in the Indian subcontinent but that was molded to Chinese culture without, however, losing its identity. Furthermore, in China, this process of adaptation does not take place exclusively within one religion but also between religions. The historical interaction and mixture between Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian principles that occurred in China has been regarded as a result of the fact that Chinese religions are "religions of harmony." They concur to integrate in an harmonious whole contradictory elements, in contrast to exclusivist religions in the West (Ching 1993).

There has been a tendency to start from the Judeo-Christian tradition to define religion. This raises the problem of trying to interpret one culture in conceptual terms derived from another. As a matter of fact, the word *zongjiao*, religion, did not even exist in China before the nineteenth century when it was introduced through Japanese translations of European works (Feuchtwang 1991:141). What I would like to argue though is that the inadequacy of a concept does not imply that it has to be dismissed but rather redefined. As Demerath claims: "Concepts must be used as flexible benchmarks instead of rigid absolutes. Indeed, it is precisely in observing how concepts themselves take on different meanings in different settings that much of the comparative task is accomplished. And not infrequently, concepts which must be altered to fit other societies wind up fitting even our own better" (1994:108).

Although the dominant religion in China was never a sectarian religion like Christianity, I agree with Ching when she argues that we can find in the Chinese tradition what is functionally equivalent to religions in the West, and that its diffused

character has much to tell us about the religious phenomenon itself (1993:1–2). The majority of scholars agree that we can speak about religion in China but the specific nature of this phenomenon has led to the development of distinct approaches. Religion has long been analyzed in terms of elite and folk levels but is now being recast as "popular religion."[5] The choice of terms has expressed basic assumptions about Chinese religion—in reaction to the separateness of "official" and "folk," the term "popular religion" was appropriated to designate an emphasis on social unities.

The dichotomies of "elite/folk," "great/little" (Redfield 1956), or "rational/ traditional" (Weber 1951) which constituted the basic structure of the first approaches to Chinese religion were challenged by C. K. Yang (1961). He proposed an analysis of Chinese religion as having two aspects: "diffused" and "institutional." According to Maurice Freedman (1974), a major implication of Yang's approach was that elite and peasant cultures were versions of each other and not two different things as they had been conceptualized.

The different approaches to the "unity/diversity" issue ascribed distinct roles to religion. According to Yang and Freedman, religion is the source of cultural unity underlying a socially diverse society. In contrast, arguments for the diversity of religious practices have tended to see religion as reflecting the social distinctions of its adherents, thereby emphasizing ethnic boundaries or differentiating groups (see Wolf 1974; Watson 1976). Weller (1980) does not side with either of the factions, developing instead a theory that accounts for both differentiation and integration. According to him, the relevant question is not whether there is diversity or unity in Chinese religion but, rather, questions such as: which type of interpretation is used by which group, in what circumstances, and for what purposes. He explores these questions in his work, and gives evidence of specific ways in which people reproduce social distinctions and social unities by assimilating different understandings and producing distinct meanings. However, as Bell claims, "he does not follow the circularity of cultural production to show not only how different groups produce different interpretations, but how the differences among these interpretations reproduce the differences among social groups" (1989:51).

It is in the work of Sangren (1987) that we find a specific concern with this circularity of cultural production and with the concomitant importance of recognizing religion as more than a mere reflection of social structure. He sees culture as the dialectical dynamic by which ideologies and social conditions produce each other, providing both differentiation and integration of various groups. I decided to follow this line of approach since it provides a more dynamic understanding of the role of religion plays in the construction of a social identity.

Religion and Ideology

In this study, I will concentrate on the way religion can be deployed as an ideological instrument and how it is manipulated to reinforce specific social identities. The issue of religion as ideology has been discussed by several scholars. Durkheim, like Marx, emphasized that religion and ideology have a social basis. However, Durkheim also accorded them a certain degree of autonomy, rejecting the historical materialist theory according to which beliefs and ideologies could be reduced to mere functions or reflections of material circumstances and interests. Max Weber, likewise rejected the reductionist materialist explanation; he argued that material circumstances and interests as well as ideas govern people's conduct (Weber 1963).

Especially relevant for this study are the discussions of religion and ideology as cultural systems put forward by Geertz. He defines culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about attitudes toward life" (1973:89). He defines religion as: ". . .(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (ibid.:90). Ideology, according to him, refers to "that part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns of belief and value," though keeping in mind that "the patterns of belief and value defended may be, of course,

those of a socially subordinate group, as well as those of a socially dominant one" (ibid.:231).

A purely materialistic theory that views ideology and religion as the outcome of specific material interests disregards the relative autonomy of religious symbolism and values. On the other hand, theories that concentrate on the religious symbolism *per se*, regardless of the social context within which it has originated, fail to acknowledge that religion is part of a wider cultural, political and economic set of relations. These theories are therefore oblivious to the "elective affinity" between status groups (or for that matter ethnic groups) and sets of beliefs, and to the way this affects religious symbolism (Bocock and Thompson 1993).

In Macao, broadly speaking, ethnic groups overlap with class divisions, though they are not reducible to class. Until very recently, the Portuguese were equated with the ruling class.[6] However, since the middle of the nineteenth century a Chinese elite class has emerged and now, with the changes in the political scenario, it plays an important political role. Within the Chinese community, however, there is social differentiation, and the Chinese elite has a considerable and undeniable political and economic power. But, to some extent, we might say that ethnic groups overlap with class divisions in the sense that Portuguese are (or more accurately—were) commonly perceived as belonging to the upper class while the majority of the Chinese population is (was) regarded as belonging to the lower class.

We can also say that ethnic groups embrace different religious systems. In this study I am particularly concerned with analyzing the ideological deployment of religion. By focusing on the nature of the relationship between ethnic groups and specific sets of beliefs we can better perceive the dynamics of this process. Religion provides an ideological field for the reproduction of political authority, and there can be more than one source of authority at one time in one place. In Macao, Catholicism[7] has been a source of political authority; the official endorsement of the Church was used by political authorities to legitimize and therefore reinforce their power as well as to gain the loyalty of the Catholic population. On the other hand, Chinese popular religion should be regarded as the source of another authority conveyed by the representation of traditionality, of a common cultural heritage. In

this research both Catholicism and Chinese popular religion, and the way they relate to each ethnic group, became the object of study.

Macao's Historical Background

As mentioned earlier, research on the construction of ethnic identity in Macao cannot be limited to the analysis of the present situation. The history of Macao was characterized by frequent transformations and is now in the process of undergoing a major change with the transition of sovereignty in 1999. Political and economic forces can bring about variations in the way social markers are manipulated, ethnic identities constructed and in the nature of the interaction between the groups. Since the communities are produced by particular historical forces, an understanding of the process of construction of ethnic identity in Macao implies a historical contextualization. I will outline the historical background, paying particular attention to the recent political and economic changes.

The first contacts between the Portuguese and the Chinese date from the first decades of the sixteenth century. But it was not until 1557 (Montalto de Jesus 1990[1926]:22) that the Portuguese established themselves in the territory. It is commonly believed that this marked the beginning of the Portuguese colony. However, a closer look at the historical data shows that until the middle of the nineteenth century it is more appropriate to speak of double sovereignty than of a true colony. The Portuguese presence in the territory since the Ming Dynasty was characterized by a strong degree of ambiguity; the Portuguese paid land tax as well as trade taxes to the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, the Portuguese only had jurisdiction over the Christian population while the Chinese were under the authority of a Chinese magistrate (ibid.:138–41). This situation was the result of what K.C. Fok calls the "Macao Formula" of the Ming policy:

> Trade relations were . . . made possible through the connivance of the provincial officials. The exchange was voluntary. Its continuance depended on the goodwill of the Portuguese to honor their obligations to the local officials and the willingness of the Chinese officials to run the risk of being censured by Peking. In realistic terms it depended on whether both sides had any compelling needs for the profits that could be derived from such an exchange. But the workability of the formula, above all, had to largely rely on the compliance and tranquillity of the Portuguese in Macao. [1991:343]

This fragile and continuously negotiated equilibrium prevailed until the middle of the nineteenth century when the Opium War, the decline of the Qing dynasty (shown in their lack of military power), and the establishment of the British colony of Hong Kong led to a shift in the situation in Macao. In 1846 the governor Ferreira do Amaral installed a colonial administration, expelling the Chinese officials and suspending the payment of land tax. In 1849, he reinforced his colonial policy through the suppression of the Chinese customs duties. His despotic attitude and disregard of the Chinese customs went as far as to destroy a Chinese cemetery to implement a new urban plan policy. This lack of concern for the Chinese population and brutal policy led to his murder in 1849. Nevertheless, the colonial administration was now established and was formally recognized in the Sino-Portuguese treaty signed in 1887.

With the consolidation of the colonial administration, the influence of the Chinese authorities diminished but persisted.[8] During the first half of the twentieth century, China was undergoing a critical period—fall of the Qing dynasty, establishment of the Republic, Japanese invasion, civil war. In such a context the issue of Macao did not constitute a priority; it was a minor problem. From 1949 onwards, with the establishment of the People's Republic of China, things started to change. In the sixties the Chinese authorities became more concerned with the situation in Macao and established contacts with leaders of the Chinese community, such as the presidents of the different kaifongs. By that time ethnic tensions within the territory were increasing. The Chinese population started to complain against discriminatory treatment and to challenge the colonial administration. Strengthened by the echoes of the Cultural Revolution in the Mainland, local Chinese voiced their anger. The conflict intensified and led to the turmoil that took place from December 1966 to January 1967 that became known as the 1, 2, 3 riots. The government attempted to brutally suppress the protests of the population which led to an upheaval of the Chinese community that was strongly supported by the government of the P.R.C. Incapable of reestablishing order, the colonial government was forced to sign an agreement in which it accepted the demands put forward by the Chinese, namely their claim to have access to the Administrative Services.

The years following the 1, 2, 3 riots were marked by hostilities and the Church was one of the institutions that was object of strong persecutions. As one of my informants, a Chinese Catholic priest, said:

> After the 1, 2, 3 riots, and during the Cultural Revolution, things become very dangerous. The Church was silent, because the Church had been very friendly with the Portuguese government and it was pro-Taiwan. The Seminary and the Catholic schools were surrounded by the members of the population. For example, the principal of the S. José School, a Chinese priest called Luis Ho, had to run away to Hong Kong for protection. He never returned to Macao. . . . Because the Church was so close to the government, due to the *Padroado*, some pro-China newspapers started warning the members of the Church saying that they knew what the priests were doing so they should be careful. Some priests got really frightened.

Although the Catholic Church was object of retaliation and some priests were persecuted, many religious people working for the congregations were protected by local Chinese. One French sister, belonging to the *Petites Soeurs* congregation, who has been living in Macao's poorest neighborhood for thirty-eight years, described what she experienced in the following way:

> The people here respect us, they even protect us. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese were writing things on the walls of the Catholic schools, private houses, everywhere. The people in this neighborhood were all wearing Maoist clothes. We cannot forget that the majority of the recent immigrants live in this area. At that time all the people in the market were forbidden to sell food to foreigners. So the other sisters and I decided that we would not go shopping so that we would not compromise the workers of the market. But, you know, we did not starve, every night we found some food left at our door, we never knew who put it there.

In the seventies, there was a major twist in the situation due to the combination of different factors. On April 25, 1974, there was a democratic revolution in Portugal that put an end to the fascist regime. In the new constitution promulgated in 1976 the status of Macao was amended: Macao was now classified as a "Chinese Territory under Portuguese Administration." All the military personnel was sent back to Portugal. Macao's government changed its policy and modernized the administration through, among other aspects, the creation of more departments that responded to the needs of the population. The relations between Portugal and the P.R.C. became closer. Simultaneously, the economic development that was occurring in several

Asian countries reached Macao. This decade was also marked by a strong increase in the number of immigrants from Mainland China.

On April 13, 1987, the Joint Declaration between Portugal and the P.R.C. was signed. Portugal formally agreed to return the territory in 1999, and the conditions for the transfer of sovereignty were established.

Relevance of the Historical Contextualization

This brief account of Macao's historical background and of the major political changes in the last decades serves different purposes. First, in order to understand Macao's present situation, it is essential to have a notion of its history. Second, it is important to clarify the fact that the Portuguese rule in the territory relied on a fragile equilibrium of interests and concessions. Macao's legal status was irrelevant in comparison with the *de facto* situation. The territory was under double sovereignty until the middle of the nineteenth century, and even during the colonial period the Chinese authorities maintained a certain degree of influence. The Portuguese government did not have the military power to confront the Chinese and therefore never managed to attain the degree of control that the British had over Hong Kong. Furthermore, instead of adopting a strict control policy like the one enforced by the British government, it opted, in most areas, for a *laissez-faire* policy. This is an important aspect that I want to emphasize since I will argue that the restriction of the political power imposed by the Chinese led the Macao government to resort to more subtle ways to reinforce its own position. And here religion played a major role as I will later demonstrate. Third, since I am particularly interested in perceiving the process of construction of ethnic identities—and political and economic changes can bring about transformations in ethnic identity and in the nature of interaction between ethnic groups—it is important to consider the historical evolution and to contextualize the existing political situation. Furthermore, the discourse of the people interviewed reflect that the historical events led not only to important changes in the nature of interaction between the different communities, but also, in certain cases, to a redefinition of personal strategies in terms of ethnic identity. An analysis of the present situation historically contextualized and taking into consideration the

profound change that will take place in 1999 and which impact is already being felt, will allow us to perceive ethnicity "in the making."

One thing that attracted my attention when I was conducting interviews in Macao, was that most people discussing their present situation felt it necessary to refer to the past. They would start commenting on something and then would say that the situation was different before this or that happened. For example, when the president of one kaifong was speaking about the present situation of the Chinese community, he immediately commented that things before the 1, 2, 3 riots were different as the Chinese had no say whatsoever in the way things were run in Macao. A Chinese priest commenting on the Catholic Church in Macao, labeled it as very conservative, and mentioned that although the ecumenical council, Vatican II, was in 1962–65, it was not until the late seventies that the new orientation of the Church reached Macao. An old Chinese lady that had converted to Catholicism when she married a Macanese fifty years ago, claimed that the people that converted in those days had to suffer more. Some members of her family would not speak to her, especially her brothers. Now things are different, "there are families where some members go to the temples to pray and others go to the Church and they do not fight because of that. There are even some people that go both to the temples and to the Church, and before that was unthinkable, the priest would not allow you to do that, and I think it was right because there is only one God." The leader of a small temple complained that now very few people are coming to the temple but mentioned that thirty years ago everybody living in the neighborhood would come; "now they just care to go to the big ones." I could go on and on quoting, but the point I want to make is that the interviews show that there was a turning point in the past, that the present situation differs from the one that existed thirty to forty years ago. Of course this can sound obvious, because in any country things are bound to change, to evolve. However, in the case of Macao it seems there has been a major change that affected the three ethnic communities—the Chinese, the Portuguese and the Macanese—in the way they conceived themselves and in the way they positioned themselves in relation one to another.

The combination of historical events of the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies profoundly affected Macao's society. The Second Vatican Council (1962–

65), the 1966–67 riots, the Portuguese Democratic Revolution in 1974, the economic growth and the wave of immigrants from Mainland China led to the adoption of a new policy by the government, to the restructuration of the political forces as the degree of intervention of the Chinese population increased, and to a new orientation of the Church. The idea conveyed by the interviews that this period marked a major shift in the way the different ethnic groups positioned themselves and related to each other was confirmed by the work of Pina Cabral and Lourenço. According to these authors, who researched for several years the dynamics of ethnicity among the Macanese community, the seventies were definitely a period of transition. In their analysis they constantly refer to the "breach of the seventies" (*a cesura dos anos setenta*) as constituting a turning point in the construction of the Macanese ethnic identity (Pina Cabral and Lourenço 1993b:126). Since the repositioning of one ethnic group cannot be done without affecting the others, it seems logical to assume that the political, economic and social changes in the seventies affected the whole patterns and dynamics of ethnicity construction in Macao. Therefore, from this point onwards, while concentrating on the way ethnic identities are presently constructed and deployed in Macao, and how religion is capitalized on (or not) in this process, I will contrast it with the situation that existed before the seventies.

To inscribe the present situation in a historical continuum is not limited to an understanding of the way things have been evolving, it is also important to take into consideration the future changes in the political, social and economic spheres. Although nobody can really predict the impact of the 1999 change of sovereignty to the P.R.C., most of the people are conscious that it will bring radical changes. So, to understand the way people position themselves presently we have to situate them in this continuum of historical circumstances and consider their future perspectives.

Macao's Present Situation

Macao has a small territory of about seventeen square kilometers (see appendix 1) and a multiethnic population of 355,693 according to the 1991 census, but much higher if we take into consideration the number of illegal immigrants, mainly Chinese and Filipinos. This can be attested by the huge number of illegal immigrants that were

deported or legalized. Between 1980 and 1991, around 125,000 persons were deported and 58,300 saw their situation legalized. In addition to the number of illegal immigrants living in the territory, there are around 47,000 persons that come daily to Macao, being referred to as the fluctuating population. Among these people are included both visitors and people from mainland China working, but not residing, in the territory.

For the purpose of this research I will consider, as mentioned earlier, that there are three ethnic groups in Macao—the Chinese, the Macanese, and the Portuguese. I am conscious that the accuracy of this statement depends on the level on which one is focusing. In other words, each person has different layers of social identity and deploys them differently according to specific contexts. For example, one Chinese can emphasize his/her provincial identity when dealing with another Chinese in order to stress either their common identity—if they were born or have their ancestral origins in the same province—or their distinct identities. However the same Chinese person will not refer to himself/herself as Fukianese, but rather as Chinese, when he/she is interacting with a Portuguese person. Accordingly a Portuguese person can emphasize the fact that he/she was born in Portugal in order to differentiate himself/herself from a Portuguese born in Macao, but he/she would simply refer to himself/herself as Portuguese regardless of other considerations when confronted with a Chinese person. In the case of a Macanese the strategies are vaster and more complex. He/she can identify himself/herself as a Macanese in the presence of Portuguese, as Portuguese in the presence of Chinese or even as Chinese when that proves to be rewarding in his/her interaction with Chinese. For the purpose of this study I am concerned with trying to figure out how these three main communities construct their ethnic identity with respect to each other.

Statistically speaking Macao's population is predominantly Chinese—95.1 percent of the total population (see appendix 2). This percentage refers to people whose parents and grandparents are all Chinese, nevertheless it also includes a small percentage of people that although descending exclusively from Chinese, regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as Macanese rather than Chinese.[9] From the total resident population, 50.3 percent were born in Mainland China (mainly in Guangdong and Fujian provinces), and only 40.1 percent were born in the territory.

Furthermore, 60 percent of the population aged twenty or above has been living in Macao for less than twenty years. These figures reflect the extreme fluidity of Macao's population.

This fluidity results from the fact that Macao has been regarded, by both Chinese and Western communities as a stepping-stone. Westerners, and in this case particularly the Portuguese, saw in Macao a strategic point of access to China, while Chinese people saw it as a key place in their migration strategy.[10] Although different historical and political contexts led to variations in these strategies, Macao was generally regarded as a point of passage. Most of the Chinese immigrants came to Macao as economic refugees and as soon as they managed to achieve a certain degree of economic stability moved on to Hong Kong or to other countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia. Only a minority chose Macao as their last destination. The Macanese have also been very transient. According to Pina Cabral, whenever there was a major crisis in Macao, for example the Pacific War, the 1, 2, 3 riots, and so on, it was immediately followed by an outbreak of migration of the Macanese elite families (1993b:80). In what concerns the Portuguese population, most of them come to Macao with short term contracts, stay for a few years, but in the majority of cases return to Portugal. In brief, Macao is characterized by a plural and highly fluid society; however the mobility of the population does not imply a reduction in the organizational relevance of ethnic identities or in the collapse of the boundary maintaining process. Each newcomer has to position himself in relation to the existing ethnic groups. Especially because of the continuous influx and outflow of population, ethnic identities have to be continuously reasserted.

1

Church and Government

Many studies have dealt with the relationship between political powers and religion showing how religion can be drawn upon to legitimate the status of a particular group and its ruling position (Duara 1988; Bocock and Thompson 1993; De Bernardi 1994). However, the nature of this relationship is sometimes regarded as being informal and subtle. This is not the case in Macao. One of the first things that caught my attention during the interviews was people's awareness of the close link between the government and the Church. One Chinese informant commented that "the government before only supported Catholic institutions, but it is now supporting some Buddhist associations to please the Chinese population, and ultimately the P.R.C. government." A Portuguese missionary argued that "because the diocese in Macao depends economically on the government, they [the bishop and the priests] have their hands tied," meaning that an economic dependence necessarily entails political passivity.

The relationship between the Portuguese government and the Catholic Church in Macao has been officially institutionalized since the sixteenth century, through the so-called *Padroado*.

> The Portuguese *Padroado* in Asia can be loosely defined as a combination of the rights and duties inherited by the Crown of Portugal as Patron of the Roman Catholic missions and ecclesiastical establishments between the Cape of Good Hope and Japan. This institution was the outcome of a series of Papal Briefs and Bulls, conferring the *Jus Patronatus* on the Portuguese Crown, in consequence of Lusitanian enterprise in discovering the unknown regions of Africa and Asia with their myriads of potential converts to the Christian faith. [Boxer 1948:3]

Macao's diocese was erected by the *Bull Super specula militantis Ecclesia* of Pope Gregory XIII, on January 23, 1576, and prevails until today although it has seen its geographical domain decrease with the establishment of new dioceses such as the one in Japan.

In 1910, the establishment of the Republic in Portugal and the implementation of an anticlerical policy led to a clear separation between the Church and the state. This was formalized through the publication, on April 20, 1911, of the "Separation Law" (*Lei da Separação*). However, surprisingly this did not apply to the Portuguese colonies in Asia since the section 190 of the law insured the maintenance of the *Padroado* (Silva Rego 1978:34). As a consequence, in 1995, we are faced with the following paradoxical situation—although Portugal is a country where the national public life and the state are completely secularized, in Macao, Chinese territory under Portuguese Administration, the Church is officially tied to the government. The nature of the political and economic ties between the government and the Church is established in the *Diploma Missionário para a Diocese de Macau* in which the legislation governing this relationship and stating the rights and duties of both institutions is compiled. In 1952 this *Diploma* was published both in the *Boletim Oficial* and in the Ecclesiastical Bulletin. Since no further legislation was published, this document has remained the legal basis determining the nature of the relationship between the government and the Catholic Church in Macao. According to my informants, however, some parts of the *Diploma* are now outdated, namely sections 9, 10 and 80 that establish that both the bishop and the priests must have Portuguese nationality, and that the benefits introduced by this law do not apply to the *membros indígenas* (indigenous members) of the Church. It would be interesting to know when this ethnic clause has stopped being applied, but changes seem to have been progressively introduced although no amendments to the *Diploma* were made. My informants were consequently unable to determine the specific date but suggested that this must have taken place during the beginning of the eighties when Chinese priests were appointed to some parishes. On the whole, however, the legislation compiled in this *Diploma* remains valid. According to this legislation the government has to include in its annual budget an amount destined to the diocese. It has to provide for most of its expenses, payment of the diocese personnel,[1] cost of maintenance, construction and restoration of its properties, donation of land when required, and so on. The 1995 budget for the Church approved by the government (see *Boletim Oficial de Macau*, no. 52, 30 December 1994) amounted to a total of 10.2 million patacas. It is important to note that the Church does not depend

exclusively on this budget since it also has its own revenues that are administrated by the bishop.

According to the *Diploma*, diocesan priests are a kind of privileged civil servants in the sense that they cumulate the benefits of the civil servants—for example free trips to Portugal every three years—with the ones that are exclusively assigned to the "clergy staff." Nevertheless, as it is stated in section 80 of the legislation, they are not regarded as civil servants because only the privileges of the civil servants apply to them, and not the disciplinary regulations, prescriptions and formalities imposed to the civil servants.

The only requirement that the diocese has to fulfill in order to justify the government's "allowance" is to send, within the first three months of each year, a report stating the number and category of the people working for the diocese as well as the total of its expenses. This report, according to an informant who works closely with the bishop, is a very general one, it does not go into the details of the diocese finances and expenses, leaving little room for governmental control. Even within the diocese very few people know how this budget is being used and what is the economic situation of the Church. One Portuguese priest commented that he receives his monthly salary, but that the parishes themselves have to be economically self-sufficient. In case of exceptional need, and upon submission of a project proposal by the priest in charge, the bishop may decide to support one parish and grant it some funds. When asked on how the government allowance was being used, this priest replied that he did not really know, that most of the activities managed by the congregations in Macao, such as schools, hospices, elderly centers are economically independent from the diocese, though, in special cases the diocese can contribute with a small amount of money. He also said that he thought that the bishop's policy was to solidify the Church's economic position due to current uncertainties regarding the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. This is a very common view put forward by most of the persons interviewed—all agreed that the bishop is mainly concerned with the management of the finances of the Church[2] but the way people evaluate this differs. Some believe that it is a good policy to insure the Church's economic situation while others are more critical and claim that he is disregarding the pastoral mission of the

Church. Among the most critical of the bishop's policy were some Portuguese laymen and missionaries who believe that the Church should concentrate its efforts in "spreading the word of God." Furthermore they regard this policy as one of the reasons, jointly with emigration, for the decreasing number of Catholics in the territory. Chinese priests and one of the Portuguese missionaries that I interviewed said that they had high expectations when this bishop, the first Chinese bishop in the history of Macao, was appointed. They had hoped that this would lead to changes within the Church, and that the bishop would be more concerned with defending the interests of the Chinese Catholic population in particular, and of the Chinese population as a whole, which they think, did not exactly happen although some changes were introduced.

As mentioned earlier the legal requirements imposed by the government for the appropriation of the annual budget consisted exclusively in the presentation of an annual report. However, this generous support provides an interesting return, in the sense that although not officially imposed, the government delegated to the Church the education and welfare functions. The first hospital was built in 1575 by the Jesuit bishop D. Melchior Carneiro. Other hospitals and health centers were run by congregations. Only since the middle of the nineteenth century did both the Chinese community, through the creation of its own hospital (1871)—*Keng Vu* (*Jinghu*), and the government started organizing their own health system prompting the Church to concentrate on other areas of social welfare. Although the government has created the *Instituto de Acção Social de Macau* (institution dedicated to social welfare activities) in the sixties, the Church still plays the leading role in this sphere. As one Italian sister said to me:

> It is very convenient for the government to delegate to the Church these services, because even if it subsidizes some of these institutions, the Church can do a better and cheaper job. We work with dedication, not for the money, and on the other hand, we are always doing extra hours without expecting any payment so as you can see this is a good deal for the government. When I was working in Hong Kong, I stayed there for fifteen years, the situation was the same.

Another field where the Church has played a leading role is education. Presently the number of private schools is still greater than the number of state schools, more

than 50 percent of the schools are administered by religious congregations (Carmo 1993). Though presently there is no university run by the Church it is important to note that the first university in Macao dating from 1594, the *Colégio de São Paulo*, belonged to the Jesuits.

Since the establishment of the Portuguese in the middle of the sixteenth century until today, the relationship between the Church and the government has been based on a strong economic link. On one hand the Church has been economically supported by the government and on the other hand, the government assumed that this entitled it to delegate to the Church some of the services that it should be responsible to provide. However, relationships based on economic links usually lead to other kinds of dependence. A major aspect of the nature of this relationship was the political one. As quoted earlier, the Church's economic dependence on the government's economic support neutralized its capacity of political contestation. Some Chinese priests have voiced their concern with this situation and seek some degree of separation from the government. The Church is often regarded as supporting the existing political powers rather than providing a field for the contestation of institutionalized powers. Church and government supported each other therefore enhancing their specific powers. In Macao's history, both bishops and priests have been frequent counselors of the government.[3] In a recent article published in the Macau magazine (Coutinho 1994:97) it was mentioned that Monsenhor Teixeira, probably the most charismatic figure of the Church in Macao, has been an indispensable adviser of Macao's governors. He arrived in Macao seventy years ago and has seen the succession of nineteen governors.

Another fact that attests the Catholic Church religious supremacy and its closeness to the institutionalized power is the appointment of the bishop to draw up the section of the Basic Law concerning religious activities[4] in Macao although he only represents 6.7 percent of the total population (percentage of Catholics living in the territory according to the 1991 census), the majority of the population being engaged in practices related to Chinese popular religion. As one priest explained to me, "the bishop was the drafter of the Basic Law. A consultative committee was created, it was composed by ninety members of all the religious communities,

including priests (I was there), Buddhist monks, Protestant pastors, and so on. They expressed their opinions but the drafting committee, constituted just by one religion, that of the bishop, had the final say."

Government and Catholic Religion—Changing Strategy

Although the Church has had a remarkable degree of political influence, this was not a one-sided relationship. The government has drawn upon religion to legitimize its political power. Religion constituted *the* criterion chosen to erect ethnic boundaries and validate its dominating position. In a certain way, according to political rhetorics, it was the Portuguese elite's Christianity and not its race or western cultural background that justified its supremacy and the entitlement to a ruling position. Many official documents until the beginning of this century refer to *Cristãos e Chins* (Christians and Chinese) rather than to Portuguese and Chinese. Though the relationships between the Church and the government in Portugal have been now and then shaken, for example during the persecution of the Jesuits instigated by Pombal in 1759, or after the establishment of the Republic in 1910, what also affected Macao—overall there was a close relationship. After the founding of the Republic, the state became secularized but since the establishment of the dictatorship in 1926 until the 1974 democratic revolution, the Church clearly sided with the government and had its total support. It was only during the seventies that Macao's government started to change its policy and progressively dissociate itself from the Church, what was later reinforced during the negotiations that led to the 1987 Joint Declaration. The government has been trying to show a certain fair play by subsidizing other Chinese religious institutions, residents associations, and by contributing financially to the reconstruction of Chinese temples. This reflects a change of policy and an obvious attempt to appease the Chinese population as well as the P.R.C. government which has not gone unnoticed by some perspicacious persons. As one of my informants said:

> Fifteen, twenty years ago the government did not pay much attention to the local people's social welfare, so this was mainly done by the Catholic Church. However, since the Sino-Portuguese agreement the Macao government wants to build a new image. The same happens with neighborhood associations, which means pro-China associations that

are now engaging in this kind of activity, providing social welfare to the old people, nurseries, schools and so on. The Church is still working for the people but the political situation has changed, the power is shifting or, in other words, the social influence is shifting. That is why neighborhood associations, in the eyes of the government, are now better partners. The governor wants to get a balance between the Catholic community and what we call the pro-China community, because both are quite influential in Macao's local affairs.

2

Church and Ethnic Groups

To understand the role played by the Catholic Church in Macao we have to take a closer look at this institution, the way in which it is internally organized and how it relates with the population.

Diocese versus Congregations

At the top of the structure we have the bishop, the leading figure responsible for both the diocese and the congregations established in the territory. I take diocese to mean the ecclesiastical—and highly hierarchical—institution under the direct authority of the bishop. Although congregations are formally under the bishop's jurisdiction, they do not form part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and they can be defined as fraternities that engage in charity and religious activities independently from the diocese.

There are a total of eleven churches and eleven chapels that are spread through the six parishes. It is interesting to note that the administrative division of the territory reproduces the ecclesiastical one; the six parishes constitute six administrative districts. The priest in charge of each parish is appointed by the bishop and has to report periodically to him. For congregations the situation is slightly different. When a particular congregation wants to establish itself in the territory, the first thing that it has to do is to seek the bishop's agreement. If the bishop allows it to establish in the territory, the congregation can start its activities, remaining under the bishop's supervision even though it is not financially supported by the diocese. Whenever the congregation wants to implement a new project, it still has to seek the bishop's approval and to present full reports of its activities. This is especially so when it is running schools or welfare services. However, in a certain way, people working for the congregations have a higher degree of independence than the diocesan priests working in the parishes. As one French sister who has been working with the poor for more than twenty years told me, "our work here has nothing to do

with the Church. Of course we are here because the bishop authorized it, but he does not really know what our work consists in. He never came to this neighborhood." Another American sister was more cautious: "we do have a certain liberty since the bishop dissociates himself from some of the initiatives; he allows but states that he does not assume any responsibility. However, we are conscious that we are guests here which makes it harder to take positions."

Although the Church, due to its strictly defined hierarchy, can be regarded as a cohesive whole, on practical terms it emerges as divided. On one hand we have the diocese that develops its work mainly through the parishes that ultimately deal with the Catholic population. On the other hand we have the congregations that through their social welfare work and schools are constantly in contact with the whole population regardless of their religious affiliation. Furthermore, until the late seventies the majority of the diocesan priests were Portuguese, as well as the bishop. Many of them did not speak Chinese, and others, though they have a certain proficiency in the language, refuse to use it. When I asked a Portuguese missionary how many Portuguese priests speak Chinese, he answered that it was difficult to say because "although some speak the language they do not admit it publicly. For example one priest that came to Macao when he was twelve years old and studied in the seminary with Chinese kids surely learned the language. Actually I already heard him talking in Chinese, but he never admits that he speaks Chinese. He works in a Portuguese parish." On the contrary, most of the people working in the congregations are mainly Chinese and non-Portuguese westerners who, due to the nature of their own work, constantly in contact with the population, are forced to learn the language.

The members of the congregations act as an important link between the Chinese population and the Portuguese administration. During my interviews with priests and sisters of the congregations, we were repeatedly interrupted by Chinese people that came to look for help, especially with bureaucratic issues, such as documents that they did not understand, letters for administrative departments that had to be written in Portuguese to ensure a faster and more efficient answer, or some particular problem that they did not know how to handle or to whom they should address themselves. In these situations the religious people acted as the go-betweens, the

ones who oriented and established the necessary links so that the problems might be resolved.

One interesting example of the degree of integration and acceptance by the population that some of the congregation members achieve is given by a small group of sisters that live in Macao's poorest neighborhood, *Ilha Verde*. In this neighborhood the criminal activity is intense. The week before I went there to speak with the sisters, it had been raided by the police, some triad members had been arrested, and several weapons seized. When I made the appointment the sister suggested that it would be better if she would come and pick me up at the bus station. Since everybody knows her there would be no problem. We went into the slum, walked along some narrow passages until we arrived at their "house," two tiny rooms and one bathroom. After an interesting conversation and a cup of tea, the sister took me along in her daily tour through the neighborhood, paying visits to the old people, bringing them some food and helping them to clean the places where they live. While we were moving from one place to another, she started commenting on the police raid, showed me where the guns had been found, where the triad members lived, and so on. Then, to my surprise, she said:

> We know what is going on, where the places for prostitution are, I even saw some of them hanging the wires outside but at that time I did not know what it was for. I just found out when the police came that it was the cables of a video camera that they had installed at the entrance of the neighborhood to control all the people that came in. But you know, the thing is that I have known them all since they were kids, I saw them growing up, they had a difficult life. Besides they do us no harm and I even help them when they ask. You must find this strange, but you know we are not here to judge; when the sinners went to God he welcomed them.

The close and continuous contact with the population that the members of the congregations have, their knowledge of the language and understanding of Chinese culture has led to two things—on one hand they are perceived by the population as being closer to them and therefore more reliable, on the other hand the people working for the congregations have a better perception of Chinese culture and a more critical stand towards the diocese and the way it has been positioning itself. One of the common criticisms raised is that the diocese is too conservative, that it maintains pre-Vatican II values. As one Chinese priest observed:

> In 1962–65 the Church had an ecumenical council, the Vatican II. From this point onward the whole attitude of the Church changed, there was a new orientation. The main slogan was *aggiornamento* which means renewal, and the main activity should be the dialogue of the Church with the different communities and cultures in the world, instead of trying to impose on them their own culture. The Church sort of adopted a new policy. However this new approach has been taking quite a long time to be implemented here because Macao's Church started in the sixteenth century so we have been for a long time under the shadow of the Council of Trent. In a certain way we can say that the Church in Macao still lives in the old days. This is in part due to the fact that most of the priests, especially the Portuguese ones, are old and it is really hard to change their mentality.

Or in the words of a Portuguese missionary:

> The Church in Macao is still quite old fashioned. The idea of evangelization was, in the nineteenth century, synonymous with civilizing. We went to Africa, to South America, poor countries in general, and besides taking the Gospel we took civilization with us. The old priests working here still have these notions. So they speak Portuguese and impose their own customs. Sometimes they hold the celebrations in Portuguese even if the people do not understand what is being said. They believe that they should do so because the official language is Portuguese.

Ethnic Differentiation within the Church

I referred to a sort of horizontal division between the diocese and the congregations but it is equally important to note that it coexists with a vertical division, in the sense that there is an ethnic differentiation within the Church. On one level we have Portuguese priests and Portuguese parishes, on the other, the Chinese priest and the Chinese parishes. Portuguese tend to go to the Cathedral, Macanese to *Santo António*, the Cathedral, and *São Lourenço*, while Chinese go to *Nossa Senhora de Fátima*, and *São Lázaro* churches among others. In some parishes there are even foreign priests that say the Mass in English or Tagalog for the large Filipino community. Ethnic differentiation is reproduced within the Church. Chinese priests run Chinese parishes, do the celebrations in Chinese for the Chinese population. Portuguese and Macanese priests, on the other hand, deal equally with both the Portuguese and Macanese communities. But when it comes to the celebration of the main festivities of the Christian calendar, such as Christmas and Easter, the Mass in the Cathedral is conducted by the bishop in both languages as an attempt to gather all

the community in the same celebration. However, on a daily basis, the celebration of the Mass in the Cathedral has a specific schedule to accommodate the different ethnic groups. As one Chinese sister observed: "In the Cathedral there is every morning at seven thirty a Mass for the Chinese. You know Chinese people always wake up early. But at five thirty there is a Mass for the Portuguese people because like that they can come after work. On Sundays the Mass for the Chinese is still at seven thirty but for the Portuguese, it is at eleven o'clock."

The choice of church implies a statement of ethnic identity since people do not limit themselves to go to the church nearest to their residence. Especially careful in the choice of church are the members of the Macanese community. As mentioned earlier, two of the main criteria of Macanese identity are religion and language, so it is particularly important for them that they choose a church where the Mass is conducted in Portuguese. By going there, they are periodically and publicly reaffirming their identity. Although it is possible to choose in which church to attend the Sunday Mass, one is supposed, for example, to celebrate baptisms and weddings in the church of the parish in which one lives. If it happens to be a Chinese parish, then the Macanese insist on having the ceremony conducted in Portuguese. This is so even when they are not proficient in the language. One Portuguese missionary who speaks Cantonese and works in a Chinese parish referred to the Macanese in the following way:

> They are fervent, the Macanese are born Catholics. Some of them barely understand anything in Portuguese but still go to the Cathedral to attend the Mass. I do not know why, but they insist, maybe it is just a question of status. Some come here and ask for the baptism to be conducted in Portuguese, then we do the ceremony in Portuguese and nobody answers because they do not understand what is being said. I get really upset and ask them why do they want the ceremonies in Portuguese if they do not speak the language. They answer that they are Macanese so the ceremony should be in Portuguese. I reply that although I am Portuguese my Chinese is good enough for me to celebrate the baptism in Chinese since they would understand the ceremony better. But they feel ashamed to confess that they do not understand Portuguese. It is really a complicated situation.

This statement reveals the symbolic value of language and religious affiliation in the construction of Macanese identity. Though religion plays a major role in differentiating the Macanese from the Chinese population, the Portuguese language

becomes essential when it comes to differentiate them from the increasing number of Chinese Catholics. If the ceremonies were not conducted in Portuguese, the participation in religious activities would lose its meaning as a periodical reiteration of their ethnic identity. By engaging in ceremonies conducted in Chinese they would be assimilated to the Catholic Chinese and religion would lose its power as an ethnic boundary.

The division of the parishes in Chinese and Portuguese is further emphasized by some segregative practices. For example, every month there are meetings for the priests that speak Chinese. Only one Portuguese priest attends these meetings. The explanation given for these meetings was that some priest only speak Chinese while others only speak Portuguese, language being a boundary difficult to cross. Consequently, very seldom do all the priests get together to discuss issues concerning the Church. The near absence of dialogue within the Church has been leading to the adoption of different postures. The "Portuguese parishes," often run by old Portuguese priests, have a more conservative approach and have kept unchanged, but the same cannot be said about the "Chinese parishes." In fact, we can speak of a progressive localization of the Church in Macao.

Localization of the Church

To understand this process it is important to take into consideration some changes that have occurred in the recent past. One important factor was the change in the system of parishes differentiation from a colonial one to a territorial one, that took place between 1962 and 1967[1] (Pina Cabral and Lourenço 1993b:122). Before that, all the Chinese Catholics were confined to the *São Lázaro* church, but from 1967 onward all Catholics, regardless of their ethnic identity, became related to the church of the parish in which they lived. These changes within the Church were further reinforced in 1976, when Arquimínio Rodrigues da Costa was appointed bishop of Macao. This Portuguese bishop had come to Macao at the age of twelve, had a better understanding of the Chinese culture, a more tolerant attitude, and a different notion of what the role of the Church should be. He started changing traditional customs, appointing Chinese priests to the parishes, and accepting some

practices from Chinese culture. It was also this bishop that for the first time in the history of Macao recommended to the Pope a Chinese priest as his successor. The Pope followed his advice and, in 1987, Domingos Lam was consecrated the bishop of Macao by his Portuguese predecessor and the archbishop of Canton, Domingos Tang.

The progressive changes introduced by the bishop Rodrigues da Costa led to a transformation of the existing scenario. Although one faction of the Church has remained eminently conservative, an opportunity was given to those who had a different conception of the way in which the Church should relate to the Chinese population.

Some of the practices in the *Nossa Senhora de Fátima* church are a good example of the process of "indigenization" of the Church that has been taking place. I am particularly acquainted with the work in this church because I spent many hours there interviewing the people that work for the Church as well as Chinese Catholics that attend the services. I have also attended many of its activities. This is the only church where the Mass is always celebrated in Chinese. As the priest Pedro Chung explains, "when I was appointed the priest of this parish in 1988, I decided to finish with the Portuguese Mass. Most of the people that live in this neighborhood are Chinese, there are also some Macanese but they do not speak good Portuguese, so I thought it was pointless to say the Mass in Portuguese." Furthermore, in this parish, some of the most important Chinese festivals such as *Chìng Mìhng* (*Qing Ming*) and *Chùhng Yèuhng* (*Chong Yang*) are commemorated through the celebration of a special Mass, while Portuguese parishes celebrate All Souls Day, the "western version" of the *Chìng Mìhng* Festival. Another major feature of this localization process can be seen through the changes in the annual calendar of the dates for the celebration of certain saints. For example, in this parish, *Nossa Senhora de Fátima* is not celebrated in May, the time of the year in which her apparition is supposed to have taken place in Portugal, but in October because the Chinese priest of this parish considers that weather conditions in this particular month are more favorable for the celebrations—"it is too hot in May, in October we are sure to have more people joining us for the festivities."

These are only some examples of what the Church has done in order to integrate more aspects of Chinese culture and to convey a Catholicism that can better reach the Chinese population. This process of localization has led to a less conservative approach to Chinese culture—people are allowed to keep several of their practices that are now conceived as part of their culture rather than manifestations of idolatry. However, the introduction of these changes is not only quite recent but also restricted to some parishes. A change in mentality usually takes longer time than economic or political changes. Most of the Portuguese priests working in the parishes are old and faithful to their old convictions. The continuing renovation of the Church in Macao lies, according to some of my Catholic informants, in the progressive substitution of these priests by a younger generation of priests that were educated after the Second Vatican Council.

The idea of the Church as a quite conservative and "western" institution (in contradiction to its claim of universality), is still very vivid in the minds of many Catholics interviewed, regardless of their ethnicity. One Chinese diocesan priest puts it this way:

> It so happens that the Catholic faith began in the West, so it reproduces in a certain way the western culture. When the Church came to Macao, it forced the local people to adapt to western culture and customs. People had to strip themselves of their own culture so that they could become Catholic. But it is not human to force the population to forget their cultural past and to adopt a completely new culture. You know how seriously Chinese people regard their own traditions; to force them to destroy their ancestors tablets was a brutal way of attempting to cut them from their past. But this is what happened until very recently and that is one of the reasons why the number of converts is not higher. I believe that Catholic faith does not have a specific form, it is universal, but we as human beings have different forms of expressing ourselves. So the Church has to adapt itself to each culture instead of trying to impose western culture on us. Actually the implementation of this ideology was one of the major achievements of the Second Vatican Council. In fact, in the past there were some priests that already advocated this idea, especially the Jesuits. For example, Matteus Ricci, when he first came to China, he dressed himself as a Chinese, he learned the Chinese language and culture. He accepted and integrated many of the Chinese customs. But afterwards there was the "rites crisis" and the conservative faction of the Church won. So the priests here in Macao were very strict, they made no concessions. Now this situation is finally starting to change.

The fact that the Church in Macao remained quite conservative for such a long time was indeed mainly due to the outcome of the Chinese Rites controversy in the

eighteenth century. Jesuits had a leading role in the diocese and believed that the moral doctrine of Confucius did not conflict with Christian morality. Many ritual observances were regarded as being purely secular rather than having a religious significance. Based on this understanding, converts were allowed to pay respect to their ancestors, participate in funeral rites and in Lunar New Year ceremonies. However, the Dominicans (mostly Spaniards) and some priests from other congregations, viewed the matter differently, and condemned the rites as acts of pure idolatry. This dispute concerning the rites and other problems, such as the appropriate translation for God in Chinese, were referred to Rome so that the Pope would evaluate the situation and take a decision. The Pope proclaimed that those rites were acts of idolatry and therefore were condemned. "Neither the remonstrations of the representatives of the Portuguese Crown, nor the opposition of the Emperor Kang-Hsi [*Kangxi*], deterred the Pope from reiterating his condemnation of the Chinese Rites, which he denounced more strongly than ever in the Bull *Ex illa die*, published at Rome in March 1715, and at Canton and Peking in the following year" (Boxer 1948:17).

The situation was further aggravated by the persecution of the Jesuits initiated by Pombal in Portugal in 1759 and continued through the Papacy's formal dissolution of the Society of Jesus in 1773. The Jesuits, who until then had played a leading part in Portuguese missionary activity all over Asia, were replaced by other religious congregations that more obediently followed the position adopted by the Vatican. The Church in Macao assumed a radical position condemning Chinese practices and making no concessions. To become Catholic, one had to stop paying tribute to his ancestors and throw away the ancestors tablets, adopt a Christian name and many aspects of Western culture. It was only in the sixties that the Vatican changed its policy[2]. It was accepted that Chinese ceremonies were of civil rather than of a religious nature and most importantly the Church reviewed its positioning and emphasized the need to engage in a dialogue with the different cultures, as it has already been mentioned.

It is interesting to note that at the same time that the Church hardened its position in the eighteenth century, the Chinese authorities were becoming more suspicious of the Church's activities and forbade the conversion of Chinese. In their

report on Macao to the Imperial authorities during the period of *Qianlong* (more precisely between 1751 and 1789) (Zhao 1994:100), two Chinese magistrates noted that there was an increasing number of Chinese that did not follow the law, converting to the foreigners' religion, adopting a foreign name, using the foreigners' language and customs, and therefore slowly becoming barbarians. They suggested that the law should be strongly enforced, that all those who did not comply with the law should be apprehended, and that the "temple of the converts" should be destroyed and the idols and books returned to the foreigners (Gomes 1950:129). In this report, Chinese converts are portrayed as having betrayed their own culture through the adoption of a foreign name and foreign customs and therefore as having crossed the boundary between the two communities; they had stopped being Chinese and had become barbarians (ibid.: 127).

Since the radical position of the Church prevailed until the seventies, Chinese converts kept being regarded by the Chinese community as having betrayed their own culture and were therefore ostracized. Stories about persecution, being mocked or having all their relations cut with their family are quite common. One Chinese Catholic priest clearly recalls being snubbed by his peers: "When I was studying in the seminary I used to go home every month, for eight hours, to visit my parents. Sometimes I would play with my brothers outside our house but the other kids made fun of me, once I was even beaten." Another kind of story that I frequently heard can be illustrated with what an old Chinese lady, who had converted to Catholicism fifty-six years ago, told me:

> I got married with a Portuguese policeman. It was he who introduced me to the Church; when I was living with my family, I used to go to the temple with them. But before I was married, I was baptized and I learned about God, so I stopped praying to Kun Iam [Guan Yin] and to A Mà. My family got really upset because during the *Chìng Mìhng* festival, I would not go to the temple with them. Besides they did not like my husband so they stopped seeing me. I really suffered. My sister sometimes came to see me but without the knowledge of my parents. . . . Later, when my father was dying I went to see him, but until this day I have never spoken again with my brothers.

I heard similar stories from other people, but all of them were women, which might be related to the fact that there is a higher percentage of women that convert than men, but I will return to this issue later on.

3

Conversion and Ethnic Identity

Patterns of Conversion

After having conducted interviews with several Chinese Catholics I started noticing that the process of conversion of the older generation seemed quite different from the one described by people in their twenties and thirties. The accounts of elderly people were filled with traumatic experiences and conversion implied a difficult and drastic decision. By converting they had, in a certain way, cut with the past and engaged in a new life. However, people in their twenties and thirties speak of their religious affiliation more as a private option that does not affect other spheres of their life and that does not compel them to any kind of segregation. Many referred the fact that other members of their family kept going to the temples and that sometimes they would join them, especially when it was for the celebration of some festivals or during the Chinese New Year. The fact that they are Catholic does not interfere with their daily life and does not have major implications, it is merely the result of a personal conviction and option.

As already mentioned, the Church reform started in the seventies and a process of localization has since then been taking place. This, together with other factors, has led to a change in the process and impact of conversion. Before, in order to convert, a Chinese person had to adopt a "Christian name" and in some cases even a surname.[1] This person was then registered for the first time in the parish—the rest of the Chinese population was not registered. Some of the converts (mainly rich Chinese) even became naturalized Portuguese. Until the first decades of this century many of the people that converted dressed like westerners and wore a Western hair style. Conversion implied the adoption of a new identity; converts were forced to give up their Chineseness in exchange for a new identity that involved the renunciation of much of what other Chinese regarded as fundamental for their ethnic and cultural identity. In general, they were forced to display an assimilative attitude towards the values and the life-styles of the Portuguese community. Once they had

done that, they had crossed the ethnic boundary and were no longer regarded by the Chinese population as belonging to their community. On the contrary, they were ostracized and regarded as having betrayed their own cultural heritage and people.

Although religion was instrumental, it is important to stress that from the Chinese perspective it was not conversion *per se* that compelled to the change of ethnic identity. As I discussed earlier, Chinese do not have an exclusivist approach to religion. It was then the implications of conversion, namely the abandoning of cultural patterns that prompted converts to be perceived as having crossed the ethnic boundary.

In this context there were, broadly speaking, two patterns of conversion. First we had the so-called rice-bowl converts. Social welfare activities were mainly in the hands of the Church. Immigrants from Mainland China that usually arrived in the territory without any kind of resources often depended on the support provided by these institutions. The diocese and congregations offered social resources and services to the poor Chinese, who, in order to repay, had to attend church services. Many of them converted since it was common that, in order to receive economic support, one had to be baptized. In most cases this was coercive in the sense that if the person did not agree to convert, he or she was not eligible for institutional support. For example, hospitals, elderly centers and other institutions run by the diocese would not admit them unless they agreed to be baptized. This policy has stopped being applied in Macao's Catholic institutions but still prevails in most Protestant institutions in Hong Kong. According to several informants who worked for congregations in Hong Kong but were later transferred to Macao, Protestant institutions are quite strict, only accepting people that agree to be baptized while Catholic institutions accept everyone regardless of religious affiliation. In certain aspects though, Catholic institutions in Macao are more conservative; for example, their ethnocentric definition of family makes it impossible for someone with relatives to be accepted in a hospice, while in Hong Kong the household is defined as "a group of people that eat rice together." Thus, in Hong Kong, if a person is not being fed by relatives, he/she will be accepted by the institution (if he/she converts).

Until the seventies, it was very common that in order to have access to the rice distributed weekly by the Church, poor Chinese families had one of their members convert. Informants usually referred to this practice as "sacrificing the grandmother to Christianity." "Grandma was the one who had to go and get the rice so she was the one who had to listen to the doctrine. First she would listen to the doctrine then she would get the rice to bring home." This reveals that conversion was a strategy to have access to resources. From the perspective of the "grandmas," conversion did not really take place. They did not embrace the new religion. They simply complied to what was required, namely accepting to be baptized, in order to guarantee economic support to their households. In fact, old women were the privileged "victims"; by converting they insured that the family periodically received a certain portion of rice and they did not jeopardize the continuity of religious practices, such as ancestor worship, and ultimately the patrilineal system. If there were no elderly women in the family, then a young woman would be chosen. I interviewed fifteen persons that fit in this pattern, they were all female and over fifty years old. Furthermore when I questioned members of the congregations on this subject, they were unanimous in saying that most of the poor converts were female.

According to my observations, I would argue that women are more prone to convert than men. The great majority of the Chinese Catholics interviewed were women, because of the simple fact that whenever I went to a church or Catholic center, the number of Catholic women present was always significantly higher than the number of men. Furthermore, in all the activities that I have attended in one Chinese parish, the majority of people involved were women of all ages and young children. On one occasion, on October 23, the priest of this parish organized a special celebration; a show was put on by the parishioners in the auditorium of the church. In total, counting both the people that participated in the show and those who attended, there were 212 persons, of which only 42 were male (representing 20 percent of the total).

This significant gender difference is not due to a single factor. First, this might be linked with the traditional pattern of greater religiosity among Chinese women than among Chinese men. As I will discuss in the next chapter dedicated to Chinese popular religion, women go more, and more often, to the temples than men. Second,

mixed weddings in Macao tend to occur between a Chinese woman and a Portuguese (or Macanese) man, which results, in many cases, in the conversion of the woman. Third, women tend to resort to social welfare more often than men, being therefore more exposed to contacts with religious people and their doctrines. Fourth, and maybe foremost, Chinese culture with its emphasis on the patrilineal system and on practices of ancestor worship makes it harder for men to convert. While a woman's conversion, or rather, as argued earlier, the abandoning of cultural patterns concomitant to conversion, is generally regarded as a minor problem, a man's "conversion" is considered to jeopardize the continuity of the family and, therefore, a challenge to the patrilineal ideology.

The combination of all these aspects explains, in my opinion, the higher percentage of women that convert. However, the localization of the Church and the acceptance of some practices, such as ancestor worship, has now opened a way for more men to convert. They can keep their obligations to their ancestors while simultaneously embracing the Catholic religion.

A second type of converts consists of rich Chinese. The advantages provided by Christianity in their cases was not primarily economic. Converts had access to a wider range of opportunities for ascension into positions of authority and prestige. Becoming Christian allowed them to assimilate with the Macanese community and gave them access to important social networks. It could also provide an important means of developing commercial relations. As Pina Cabral and Lourenço note in their study of the Macanese community, it was always possible for a Chinese convert to be completely integrated into the Macanese community as long as he had some western education and was a prestigious person—the more prestigious the better protected he was from possible acts of discrimination (1993b:132). Conversion, then, was the result of a strategy to achieve social mobility. There were other possible strategies like, for example, matrimonial strategies. However, matrimonial strategies were not as attractive since rich Chinese tended to consider inter-ethnic marriages as lessening prestige, a fact that might have led them to select religion and conversion as the preferential strategy of integration into the Macanese community.

This pattern of conversion led to the adoption of an ethnic identity distinct from the one attained by the "rice-bowl" converts. Although conversion *per se* implied the adoption of a new identity since one had to abdicate from one's cultural patterns, this did not mean that those who became Christians were automatically integrated into the Macanese community. Only rich Chinese had that privilege. As a matter of fact, "rice-bowl" converts constituted a specific community of their own, they were in between, they had left the Chinese community and were not assimilated by the Macanese community. In a certain sense they were not Chinese because they had converted but at the same time they lacked the other assets that would have allowed them to merge into the Macanese community. This unique community was described by Reverend Carl Smith as "Chinese, yet Christian, Catholic, yet not Macanese" (Smith 1995:367). This community had its "liminal" situation reinforced by the fact that it became in a certain sense a closed community which, in the beginning, was even geographically situated "in-between." In Macao's territory there was a wall delimiting the city where the Portuguese lived, and where the Chinese could go to work but could not reside. Outside this wall was the area designated for the Chinese. In 1808, a settlement of Chinese Catholic refugees was established close to the walls of the Portuguese city. Although many of them left due to the pressure of the Chinese imperial authorities, this area later became the *São Lázaro* parish, *the* Chinese parish. Since, until the transformations of the seventies, all Chinese Catholics were confined to this parish, we can see a distinct policy of segregation. By not being allowed to belong to other parishes, they were being refused the right to integrate the Catholic community as a whole. This discriminative attitude towards Chinese Catholics is reflected by the derogatory term still currently used—they are frequently referred to as "*Cristãos novos*" (new Christians).

A prominent feature of the Chinese Catholics from *São Lázaro* was that they retained their Chinese surnames while the other Chinese that converted adopted a Portuguese surname and became integrated in the Macanese community. Although conversion necessarily implied the adoption of a new identity, it is also true that different patterns of conversion led to the adoption of distinct identities. One person that was introduced to me as Macanese later confirmed that both his parents were Chinese, but stressed the fact that they were Catholic and that he himself was not

only Catholic but had also been to a Catholic school and had married a Macanese woman. Other Chinese Catholics interviewed, although referring to themselves as Chinese, constantly emphasized their differences from non-Catholic Chinese. This was particularly frequent when the persons interviewed were over fifty years old.

The fact that there were different levels of integration—some managed to be absorbed by the Macanese community while others, although giving up the social markers of Chinese culture, were never completely integrated and formed a community of their own—reveals that the official rhetoric that emphasized the distinction between *Cristãos e Chins* served distinct purposes. First, it legitimized the government's ruling position; second, it enabled the government to have jurisdiction over the Chinese converts, since by converting they had crossed the ethnic boundary and were therefore no longer under the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. The political rhetoric created the illusion that those who converted would be regarded (and treated) as one of "them." In reality, they became subjects of the Portuguese authorities but were never completely assimilated. This demonstrates how religion played an instrumental role in the exclusion of Chinese converts from the Chinese community but conversion *per se* was not sufficient to make them Macanese; other assets were also required

Why and How Conversion Patterns have Changed ?

Macao has seen major changes from the late sixties onward. There has been a progressive shift in the configuration of the political and economic powers, an "indigenization" of the Church, and a more tolerant approach of the congregations. In what concerns the congregations it is important to underline the fact that people working for the congregations were unanimous in stating that they helped anyone regardless of their religious affiliation and that, in most cases, they accepted behaviors that can be described as being religiously syncretic. A perfect example of this kind of approach can be given by quoting an American Maryknoll sister that is in charge of a center for the elderly in the *Nossa Senhora de Fátima* district.

> We welcome anyone, we do not discriminate anybody. . . . We are here to serve these people. . . . Outside we have the statue of *Nossa Senhora de Fátima*. Sometimes parents come here with their children and they ask who is that? I say "*Sing mou*, the Holy

> Mother," and they reply "*Sing mou* Kun Iam?" Well, I say, more or less. . . . Some of the old Chinese converts here have a very rigid approach to religion, much of it is pre-Vatican II, the strict God, the judgmental God, . . . maybe because in the old times they had to give up everything to become Christian. They had to burn their ancestor tablets and so on. So sometimes they have a sort of "I am better than you" attitude, a superiority complex. There is a lot of "if you have not been baptized you cannot be saved." Sometimes there are even some hostilities between those who are baptized and those who are not or those that although being baptized still keep some of their Chinese practices. We try to fight against these attitudes and to convey a different message. . . . As I tell my own folks, when they will go up to Heaven they will find the Blessed Mother, Kun Iam, and *Tìn Hauh* (*Tianhou*) all waiting for them to make the fourth in mahjong. And my non-Catholics think it is great, while some of my Catholics are scandalized. I think it is really good to have Kun Iam, the Blessed Mother and *Tìn Hauh* playing mahjong, just waiting for the fourth leg. It is also interesting to see the number of my non-Christians who go over and say a prayer for the Blessed Mother. Sometimes they go there in the morning and even bring some flowers to her because they think that she will like it.

This Maryknoll sister conveys with humor what seems to be the general attitude of people working in the congregations. This more tolerant approach together with the other factors already referred has prompted patterns of conversion different from those that were common before the seventies. The pattern of the "rice-bowl" convert prevails but has now different implications. To convert does not imply anymore the adoption of a new identity. A significant percentage of the people converting are those that are in contact with, or depend on, certain religious institutions that are engaged in social welfare activities. However, today people do not have to be baptized in order to have access to these services. Furthermore, if they do convert they are not forced to abandon most of their former practices. In fact, several of them keep those practices. During interviews, converts would at first, because they were speaking with a Westerner and they tend to equal Westerner with Catholic, deny engaging in Chinese religious practices. As the time passed, some would confess that in fact sometimes they went with family members to the temples. One old lady of the elderly center told me once when we were alone that she thought that:

> all gods can help us if we are good and sincere in our prayers but sometimes some gods work better for some people than they do for others. I myself have prayed to Kun Iam since I was a little girl and now that I am Catholic and pray to *Fátima*, I have not stopped saying my prayers to Kun Iam. I do this and I do not think it is wrong but I do not want some of them [other ladies in the center] to hear me say this because they will

criticize me. The sister knows and she thinks that there is no problem so I keep on doing it. Like this I feel better with myself.

Those who are presently more critical of this kind of attitude are not, as it might be expected, the priests, sisters and missionaries (although there are a few exceptions), but some of the old Chinese converts that advocate a strict religious orthodoxy. They display a total intolerance towards the persons that have a more syncretic approach to religion, that either integrate elements of Chinese culture in their religious practices or maintain both religious practices. One explanation for their orthodoxy given by some members of the Church (Chinese and non-Chinese) was that, in most cases, this is the result of a traumatic process of conversion. Most of these people were ostracized by their family and community and had their connections with them cut. Therefore, they tend to regard those who did not go under the same process, and who have kept their links, as being, in a certain sense, less good Catholics than themselves.

The Church in Macao, besides being engaged in social welfare activities, has also played a key role in the education field. In the past, the majority of schools were run by the different congregations and presently 50 percent of them are still in the hands of the Church. At this level, the priority of the Church is to enhance the standard of education rather than to "spread the word of God" but schools have, nevertheless, provided a medium for conversion. They offer quite a good education in different languages; some of the schools even have a Chinese, a Portuguese, and an English section. Furthermore, most of these schools have connections abroad which facilitates obtaining scholarships to conduct undergraduate and graduate studies in other countries. It is important not to forget that the University of Macao is quite recent, provides a limited choice of courses, and has a limited quota for students. Prestigious universities in Portugal, the United States, England, or Australia, and formerly in Taiwan[2] are usually preferred. At the same time the Church provides afterschool programs that assist children with their homework and have a high degree of attendance since parents usually have no spare time to go over the huge load of home work with their children and prefer that they remain in the schools or in the institutions that provide these services rather than having them staying at home alone. The Church also offers other programs such as Youth Fellowship, Sunday schools

and Bible study. These programs reinforce important academic and professional skills.

Although it is not required to be a Christian to enroll in these schools or to take part in most of the programs, in some cases (for example to obtain scholarships), it can prove to be helpful. Very little emphasis is put in evangelization in these schools but it is important not to forget that teachers play an important role in the socialization process and quite often constitute role models. Most of the young Catholics I have interviewed, the majority being university students, had converted because they had attended Catholic schools and one of their teachers with whom they had a special relationship had introduced them to Catholicism. In one case a student of a Catholic school had not only converted but also initiated her grandmother, being both baptized simultaneously.

The institutional support provided by the Church offers Chinese Catholics an important educational alternative, one that appears to confer them a certain educational advantage over the children who attend schools that are not run by the Church.[3] Some families that plan to emigrate or that wish that their sons and daughters further their education abroad tend to enroll their children in the schools run by the Church. Some of these students eventually end up being baptized, although they represent a small percentage of the total number of students enrolled in these institutions.

Nowadays, as before, conversion grants an opportunity for upward social mobility. The kind of conversion that we witness now though does not imply anymore the adoption of a new ethnic identity. Of course, changes in religious affiliation are bound to lead to a redefinition of the self, to a new personal identity. But, as long as they are conceived as the result of a mere personal option that does not conflict with ongoing cultural practices, when converts are allowed to retain their cultural background and, in a certain way, to project it into those practices, then it does not lead to the adoption of a new ethnic identity. To adopt a new ethnic identity as a result of conversion implies that one person, by converting, adopts new cultural patterns and dismisses the former ones. Furthermore, it implies that this is perceived, not only by him/herself, but most importantly, by the others, as resulting in the

crossing of an ethnic boundary. This was, until quite recently, certainly the case in Macao, where, as one of my Catholic informants stated, "one had to become Portuguese before one became Catholic"—implying that one had to adopt some Portuguese cultural practices before one was regarded as a Catholic.

Catholic Religion and the different Ethnic Groups

In Macao's multiethnic context, the way in which Catholic religion relates to and is used by each ethnic group differs. Portugal, as it is well known, is a Catholic country, and the majority of its population is constituted by either practicing or nominal Christians. However, since most of the other Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy are also Catholic countries, religion does not play a major role in terms of ethnic identity. For example, when Portuguese people want to emphasize their specific identity as being distinct from the Spanish, they have to rely on other cultural aspects to assert their own ethnic identity. However, the same Portuguese that in Portugal do not draw upon religion as a major aspect of their ethnic identity, are likely to do so in Asia. This demonstrates how flexible and contextual ethnic identities are. One ethnic group does not systematically draw upon the same cultural features to differentiate itself from others. On the contrary, it is in each contact with another ethnic group that it evaluates which are the distinct features that it can draw upon to differentiate itself.

When the Portuguese first arrived in China, the population practiced Chinese popular religion and there was, in general, no knowledge about Catholicism. As a matter of fact, one of the main reasons that led the Portuguese to come to China and to establish themselves in Macao was the desire to evangelize the Chinese population. The missionary project existed from the beginning of the establishment of the territory and due to the *Padroado*, the government played a major role in the development and implementation of this project. Simultaneously, religion provided not only the legitimization of their political power but also the basic criterion for ethnic differentiation. After all, as was stated in official documents, they were the "Christians" while the others were the "Chinese." This situation remained relatively unchanged for more than four hundred years. It was only in the last two to three

decades that things have started to change, that Macao has seen a progressive secularization of the government that was reinforced by the political changes associated with the negotiations for the transfer of sovereignty in 1999. Although the majority of the Portuguese population is still Catholic, religion has stopped being deployed as a major asset of the Portuguese ethnic identity. This is mainly due to two different things. First, the government has been trying to dissociate itself from the Church. Second, the majority of the Catholic population is now Chinese rather than Portuguese or Macanese (more specifically, two thirds of the twenty five thousand Catholics in Macao are Chinese) (Leal 1994:84).

Since Portugal is a Catholic country, it is commonly assumed that a Portuguese person is Catholic, this being something implicit and that is not necessary to reassert continuously. For the Macanese, however, Catholicism, together with Portuguese language and culture, and Eurasian ancestry (*mestiçagem*), constituted the most important criteria of ethnic identity. It had, therefore, to be systematically reiterated. The emphasis put by Macanese on their religious practices has led them to project an image of themselves as rather orthodox. According to one priest:

> The Macanese are more Catholic than the Pope, they are born Catholic. They even think that they do not have to learn more about the Bible and so many of them do not enroll their children in catechism classes. For them what is really important is to have their children baptized, to go to the church on Sunday, and to have a Catholic wedding. They seem to be more worried with following the rules in a strict way rather than with understanding the meaning behind them.

The relevance of religion, Catholicism, relied not only in the fact that it created a common ground with the Portuguese community, but also in the fact that it allowed a continuous integration of new members into the Macanese community. Religion is by far the most flexible of the criteria that define Macanese ethnic identity. Conversion was, for the Chinese, a viable means of integrating the Macanese community. If the person that converted possessed other resources, such as prestige, wealth, and/or a certain familiarity with the Portuguese culture and language, this person would be regarded as a member of the Macanese community. However, even if this did not happen because that person did not hold those assets, the next generation, being brought up in Catholic schools and more exposed to a western environment, might then become full members of the Macanese community.

Inter-ethnic marriage was another way of absorbing external elements into the Macanese community. These marriages were asymmetrical in the sense that they usually entailed a wedding between a Macanese man and a Chinese woman,[4] the reverse being quite unusual. Chinese women were generally baptized before the wedding and in most cases had their relationship with their family, and Chinese society in general, severed. The children of the couple were raised within the Macanese community rather than within the Chinese one. Among the fifteen old Chinese Catholic ladies that I have interviewed, there were four such cases.

According to Pina Cabral and Nelson Lourenço, there have been major changes in the relationship between the different criteria that define Macanese ethnic identity. This has been taking place since the seventies due to a readjustment of ethnic positions resulting from a change in the political forces. This shift has consisted basically in the abandoning of exclusivist attitudes towards the Chinese concomitantly with a diminishing identification with the Portuguese culture. The authors believe that Macanese ethnic identity now relies on an increasing valorization of the resources of intercultural communication rather than in the promotion of a certain "Portugueseness" (1993b:238–39). This implied a radical change in the role played by religion. The importance of Catholicism has diminished, though it has not disappeared. The majority of the Macanese are still Catholic but some now openly engage in Chinese religious activities. Catholicism has lost the religious exclusiveness it tried to enforce. Some Macanese persons "confessed" that although they were Catholic they went to the temples in certain festivals and that they frequently consulted fengshui experts.

Another aspect that reveals the diminishing significance of Catholicism is the change of matrimonial practices. Until the seventies it was common for a Chinese bride to be baptized before she got married with a Macanese. However, presently this practice has declined and as a result there is an increasing number of "inter-faith" weddings. From 1987 to 1990, "inter-faith" weddings between Chinese and Macanese constituted 66.67 percent of the total of weddings between the two ethnic groups (Pina Cabral and Lourenço 1993b:134). This change in matrimonial practices is actually interpreted by Pina Cabral and Lourenço as a new trend for the Macanese that want to be integrated in the Chinese middle class.

It seems that there is a tendency to de-emphasize aspects such as Catholicism and Portuguese language and culture, that used to play a major role in the construction of the Macanese ethnic identity. Simultaneously, the links with the Chinese population are being reinforced. This change of strategy is a result of the political situation and of the increasing proximity of 1999. It is important to note that this "survival" strategy is not uniformly adopted. According to my interviews, the Macanese that plan to remain in the territory after 1999 are more prone to do so than those who are already planning to join one of the "Macanese Diaspora Communities" in North America, Australia or Portugal. Those that will leave seem to remain orthodox in their practices and less likely to integrate new practices and values. One Macanese woman that has already bought a house in Portugal and that plans to move there in the near future said to me that both her sons were in Catholic schools and that she did not allow them to speak Chinese at home though they are more fluent in this language. However, another Macanese woman that does not have economic resources to emigrate decided to attend courses in oral Mandarin and has enrolled her children in Chinese courses so that they do not feel ashamed, like her, of not being able to write in Chinese.

Although my research did not have as its main object the Macanese community and this issue deserves further research, it seems probable to me that if the present trend continues—in the sense of the Macanese in Macao opening to the Chinese community although emphasizing their intercultural background, while the Macanese of the Diaspora keep emphasizing their links with Portuguese culture and language and their Catholicism—we will see a progressive schism within the Macanese community. This would not be surprising since the construction of ethnic identities is intimately connected with the context within which they are generated. With the loss of the political dominance of the Portuguese and with the drastic diminishing of the Portuguese population in the territory after 1999, it becomes more "profitable" to emphasize one's "Chineseness" rather than one's "Portugueseness." This change of emphasis being possible for the Macanese due to the flexible bases on which their identity lie.

The political changes of the last two decades and the major transformation constituted by the transfer of sovereignty in 1999 are bound to affect not only

Macanese ethnic identity but also to lead to a redefinition of Chinese ethnic identity. Chinese constitute the majority of the population and the transformation of the political situation will definitely affect them and the way in which they perceive themselves as an ethic group.

This imminent political change will affect the role religion played in the drawing of ethnic boundaries. In what concerns Catholicism, as was extensively discussed before, religion affected the construction of Chinese ethnic identity by compelling those who converted to adopt a new ethnic identity. In the last two decades, changes in the political and economic environment, a decreasing governmental support of the Church and a progressive localization of the Church have led to a decrease, if not complete eradication, of the importance of religious affiliation to determine ethnic identity. In my view, only those who became Catholic before the seventies, and experienced a traumatic conversion process having severed their ties with non-Catholic members of the Chinese community, will continue to perceive themselves as possessing a distinct ethnic identity.

Presently, conversion has started to be socially regarded as the result of an individual option that does not entail the loss of one's own ethnic identity. Chinese people who converted recently maintain, to a high or low degree, their previous cultural practices. They maintain their relations with the rest of the Chinese community. It is even quite common to find families that have different religious affiliation without that causing any kind of distress in the family. Converts now maintain their cultural practices, Catholicism has stopped being drawn upon by both government and the Church as the criterion that defines ethnic affiliation.

PART 2

CHINESE POPULAR RELIGION

4

Chinese Popular Religion and the Political Power

In the former part I have discussed the role of the Catholic Church in Macao, analyzed the nature of its relationship with the colonial government and demonstrated the way in which religious affiliation can be used in the construction of ethnic identity. However, keeping in mind that 95 percent of the population is Chinese, a clear picture of the intricacies of the relationship between religion and power and the way in which religion can constitute a major asset of ethnic identity can only be obtained by also looking at Chinese popular religion. This part will thus provide the complement of the former part.

As argued earlier, I seek to combine the anthropological approach with an historical perspective in this study of religion. I will, therefore, attempt to demonstrate how the role of Chinese religion has changed during the period of Portuguese rule. I will then focus on public practices, more precisely on temple management and temple activities since temples constitute some of the most prominent institutions of Chinese religion. I will also draw a profile of the worshippers based on the data provided by a survey conducted in one temple. By looking at how the role played by temples has evolved and adapted to new circumstances and how they respond to the changing needs of the Chinese population, we can better perceive the role played by Chinese religion. But I will first analyze the nature of the relationship between Chinese popular religion and the political power.

Chinese Popular Religion and the Colonial Government

Since, as mentioned earlier, the territory remained under double sovereignty until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese had jurisdiction exclusively over the Christian population while the non-Christian Chinese were under the authority of a Chinese magistrate. It was therefore out of the realm of the Portuguese authority to regulate Chinese religious activities. This, though, did not mean that there were no scattered attempts to interfere with those practices and to limit the construction of

new temples and expansion of existing ones. As a matter of fact, the governor and the Senate were systematically under the pressure of the Catholic Church to control and eradicate those practices but they had their hands tied due to the power exercised by the Chinese magistrates. The ambiguous political situation led to numerous but unrewarding rows between the Portuguese and the Chinese authorities. There are, in the historical archives of Macao, several official letters dating from the middle of the eighteenth century documenting these disputes, for example letters from the Commissioner of the Holy Office (Inquisition) and the bishop to the Senate urging the prohibition of rites and ceremonies of the "pagans" as well as the construction of temples.[1] There is also a letter from the governor to the Senate regarding the request for a license to build a mat shed (*barraca*) for a procession that the Chinese planned to hold. He argued that the *Procurador* had advised him that it would not be possible to stop the erection of the mat shed since the Chinese had already decided to do it. But he reminded the Senate that these things had to be controlled since it is a common practice of the Chinese to start building small things and then progressively enlarge them (Macao 1971:127–28). This letter shows that the Portuguese authorities were conscious of their limited capacity of interference in the Chinese activities. This was in fact stated in one of the letters from the Senate to the Commissioner of the Holy Office, dated July 1758. It said that it had been agreed by the bishop, the governor and the members of the Senate to oppose, as much as possible and without violence, all the religious activities of the Chinese (*pagodices de Chinas*). However no new measures should be taken without the determination of the "Holy Tribunal" (*S.^to Tribunal*) and the King since, as it was well known, the Portuguese had little or no power over the Chinese (Macao 1965:190). As a matter of fact, whenever the Portuguese attempted to implement some coercive measures, they were forced to retract their position by the Chinese authorities.

If the ambiguous political situation that prevailed during the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in the territory explains the lack of effective control and regulation of the Chinese religious activities, one would expect that with the consolidation of the colonial power in the middle of the nineteenth century the situation would have changed. That certainly was the case in Taiwan during the Japanese occupation—especially in the late thirties when assimilationist policies were

implemented (Feuchtwang 1974). In Hong Kong as well, the British government started controlling Chinese religious activities a few decades after the establishment of the colony through the regulation of temples. In 1928, the Hong Kong Government Chinese Temples Ordinance was passed requiring all temples to register with the government and to submit an accounting report of their ownership, management, property, revenues, and the use of these revenues. Furthermore, a Chinese Temples Committee[2] was created, whose function was (and still is), among others, to control temples' activities. This Committee has the power to expropriate those temples which it considers are operating exclusively for private profit (see Stevens 1980; Sinn 1989; Lang and Ragvald 1993).

In Macao, the government never created a similar regulation and there has never been an institution similar to the Hong Kong's Chinese Temples Committee. Colonial officers, ignorant of Chinese customs, practices and language, usually adopted a *laissez-faire* policy. They preferred to leave the Chinese to their own devices rather than to interfere as long as public order and their own interests were not threatened. Without any government supervision, the power of the temples' lay committees grew and they became richer. In the twenties some of these committees decided to create benevolent associations and have them registered. That, among others, was the case of the Ma Kok Miu (*Mage Miao*) and the Kun Iam Ku Miu associations (see *Boletim Oficial* dated respectively, 17 July 1926 and 22 September 1928—documents reproduced in appendices 8 and 9). One possible explanation for this sudden urge of the lay committees of the temples to register as benevolent associations may be the fact that echoes of the ongoing situation in Hong Kong had reached Macao and they were fearful that the government would adopt similar measures.

In what concerns the funds and the way temples are managed, the government did not have, and does not have, any kind of control or even knowledge. As the leader of one temple argued:

> We manage the temple the way we want, it is the temple committee that decides what to do. The government does not control anything, they do not know about our investments or the way we run the temple, this is how it has been and how it should remain. . . . We never submit reports of our activities or our accounts and we never pay taxes. Well, Ma Kok Miu pays land tax because the land belongs to the government, but that is the only case that I know.

Furthermore, the government has no idea of the real estate that each temple possesses. As is true for the Catholic Church in Macao, many of the properties donated to, or acquired by, the temples are still not registered and, consequently, only the people that run the temples know the extent of their possessions.[3] This situation has generated some controversies. In one of my interviews with the monk that is running the Kun Iam Tong, he said that several of the properties of the temple are rented out[4] and because they are not registered they have faced some problems in the past. For example, when the person that was paying the rent to the temple died, the inheritors sometimes refused to keep the contract and claimed the property for themselves. Since there was no legal document and some of the tenants had been paying the rent for several generations it was difficult to prove that the property belonged to the temple.

The fact that most properties are not registered has also led to some disputes between the temples committees and the government. One example is the case described in a Chinese language newspaper (*Ou Mun Iaht Bou/ Aomen Ribao*, 17 July 1992). According to an article published in this newspaper, the leader of the Taipa Kun Iam temple complained that the Melancia Government (Melancia was Macao's governor between 1987 and 1991) had sold some land belonging to the temple to a developer that planned to build a factory. According to the leader of the temple, that piece of land had been sold by a local peasant to the temple more than thirty years earlier. Since, as it was highly common in those days, there was no official document for this transaction, the temple committee could not legally claim possession of the land. In an attempt to have the matter settled the leader of the temple invited the new governor and some of the secretaries for a vegetarian lunch. He used this circumstance to voice his feelings—he complained about the previous governor's action, emphasized that the temple was a tourist site that would be destroyed if a factory was built on that site. The Secretary for Public Works, Machado, replied that now it was almost impossible to solve the problem but that he would look into this case. In this newspaper article, it is also stated that since the present leader got in charge of the temple in 1953 he managed to buy, with the money coming from donations, six thousand square meters of land. This is quite a

substantial extent of land considering that it is a small temple and that few worshippers go there.

The relationship between the temples and the government could be considered one sided in the sense that although no taxes are paid to the government and no control is exercised over the revenues of the temples, the committees can apply for governmental economic support. The majority of temples in Macao are considered historical monuments and as such, they are entitled to receive financial support. The Cultural Institute of Macao (*Instituto Cultural de Macau*) is the institution supported by the government that is responsible for the preservation of the historical buildings of the territory. The allocation of a subsidy for maintenance work depends on several criteria and are determined by this institute. According to the architect that is responsible for these projects in the Institute, the restoration of temples raises several problems due to the fact that there is no legislation compelling owners to the preservation and maintenance of the buildings. Consequently, even if the funds are available they cannot proceed with the restoration works if the owners object to them. Each time that it is decided to restore a particular temple, the Institute has to have negotiations with the committee of that temple and sometimes disagreements occur. This has led, in extreme cases, to the impossibility of conducting the restoration of the temple.

One example of a complicated negotiation was the one the Institute had with the leader of the Kun Iam Temple. At first he refused to allow the works. When he finally agreed, he demanded that the funds be allocated to him and that he then would be responsible for the works. However, this is against the policy of the Institute which has its own construction company and conducts the work itself under close supervision. After several meetings the leader of the Kun Iam Tong finally allowed the restoration work to take place. When I first interviewed the leader of the temple I was not aware of this and I asked him whether the temple had received any kind of economic support from any governmental or cultural organization and he replied that it did not. On our second meeting I showed him the list of temples that had been restored by the Cultural Institute of Macao since 1992, where the amount of money spent in the works is listed. According to this list, in 1992, MOP$807,800 were spent on work in the Kun Iam Temple. He finally admitted that some work was done but

that he knew little about it since nothing had been discussed with him. He further argued that:

> they just painted a few things and substituted some bricks and some doors. They did not spend as much as they say, at most they have spent MOP$600,000. These are very old buildings and the reconstruction work is always very expensive so the government should support these costs. After all this is a tourist site and when tourists come to Macao they have to pay taxes to the government so it should be the government's responsibility to maintain these buildings.

The leader's attitude reflects an unwillingness to acknowledge the government economic support. He ultimately attempted to legitimize the government's involvement by arguing that since the temple is a touristic site, it is the government's responsibility to finance its maintenance. The leader's reluctance to confirm having accepted governmental subsidy might be linked to the fact that this distorts the image he is trying to portray of the temple as an independent institution.

In the past few years several temples have been restored by the Institute and the money spent in each temple averages one million patacas. In certain cases, however, it exceeds this sum. According to one article published in the *Va Kio* (*Huaqiao*) newspaper (*Va Kio*, 25 March 1992), the Ma Kok temple had been partially destroyed by a fire. The extent of the damage was considerable and the cost of the reconstruction works high; MOP$1,869,000 were granted by the Cultural Institute of Macao for its reconstruction.

The allocation of a fund for restoration works depends on several criteria but since the main purpose of these actions is to preserve the historical monuments of the territory, one would suppose that any temple that had been built several centuries ago and had historical and architectural value would be eligible to get this kind of support. It seems though that this is not always the case. The Kun Iam Ku Miu is one of the oldest temples in Macao; although the exact date of its construction cannot be determined, it is believed that it was built in the first years of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) (Amaro 1967). This temple needs to be restored and its leader argues that he has applied several times for a subsidy from the Cultural Institute of Macao but that until now, no financial support has been granted. According to him, "only temples that attract many tourists, such as the Ma Kok Miu and the Kun Iam Tong,

are being subsidized by governmental institutions and that does not make sense because they are the ones which need less help since they are rich temples." In fact, the two temples mentioned have funds that could cover the restoration work expenses. However, since the government is willing to subsidize the works, the money saved by these temples can be directed to other purposes. A paradox results from this situation. Temples that need economic support are less prone to receive subsidies and risk disappearing, while affluent temples see their financial situation consolidated since they can rely on the government to cover those expenses.

Temples constitute a major touristic attraction in Macao. All the tours, even when they consist in a single-day trip to the territory and their main purpose is to take the tourists to the casinos, often include a brief visit to one temple. Although the Macao Government Tourist Office pamphlets advertise several temples, it is clear that a greater emphasis is put on the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Miu. During my fieldwork, each day that I spent in the Kun Iam Temple was marked by a constant flow of tourists. A bus parked in front of the temple almost every half an hour, a group of tourists would flock into the temple and spend a few minutes taking pictures. Asian tourists usually lingered at the temple for a longer period since some of them spent some time lighting incense and making some offerings. The fact that the two temples mentioned are major touristic sites could be one of the explanations why the government is more willing to spend money on restoration works.

Government intervention, through free advertisement and participation in the maintenance of these two temples, seems to have affected and inflated the level of prestige of these temples by comparison with others temples of the territory. There is a cleavage in terms of prominence, number of worshippers, and total revenue between these two temples and the remaining temples in the territory.

Chinese temples in Macao can be regarded as a symbol of the Chinese community. Whenever there is a visit to the territory by leading Portuguese officials, their busy agenda always includes a visit to one major temple.[5] Temples, in contrast with other institutions such as Chinese associations, constitute privileged symbols for the Portuguese authorities due to their apolitical nature. They represent the Chinese community and the visit of a leading official is regarded as a public acknowledgment

eof the importance of this community. However, during their short stay, Portuguese officials also pay a visit to the *São Paulo* ruins. The church of *São Paulo* was built during the first decades of the seventeenth century and is commonly regarded as a master piece and the apogee of Christian art in the Far East (Couceiro 1994). In 1835, the church was almost completely destroyed by a fire; only its facade survived and has been maintained as a symbol of the evangelization mission in the East. The fact that a visit to both the ruins of the *São Paulo* church and one major temple (the Kun Iam Tong or the Ma Kok Miu) is systematically included in visiting officials' busy agenda seems significant. While the ruins of the *São Paulo* church symbolizes the Christian, and by extension the Portuguese, presence in the territory, temples represent the major ethnic group, the Chinese. Religion is drawn upon to emblematize ethnic identity. By visiting both places, Portuguese political officials are symbolically recognizing both communities and acknowledging their responsibility towards both of them.

Chinese Popular Religion and Chinese Authorities

In China, during the late imperial period, many villages had no village-wide organizations other than religious ones. Religious institutions provided the framework for organizing authority in rural areas, and temples were the center of religious and secular functions (Duara 1988). Macao was no exception; on the contrary, Chinese religious institutions in the territory acted as a bridge between the local community and the Chinese authorities.

Until the consolidation of the colonial power in the middle of the nineteenth century, Chinese residents in the territory were still subjected to Chinese law and Chinese jurisdiction and were under the authority of the Guangdong province officials. When these officials went to Macao they chose temples and monasteries as their temporary residences. Macao is a peninsula joined by a narrow isthmus to the Guangdong province and the Lin Fong Miu is situated near the gates that were built by the Chinese in the isthmus. Due to its privileged location, enabling the control of the circulation between Macao and China, this temple was chosen as the residence of the Chinese officials. The P'ou Tchai Sin Ün (*Pujichan Yuan*) monastery located

right next to the Kun Iam Tong, center of social and administrative activities, was also used to accommodate Chinese authorities. In 1731 an assistant judge nominated to supervise and administrate justice to the Chinese population and to deal with affairs concerning the Portuguese, had his permanent residence in the Kun Iam Temple (Porter 1990:54).

Although there was an appointed judge lodged in one of the major temples, the Chinese often submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of persons other than the representatives of the state, namely to the lay committees of their own neighborhood temples. These neighborhood temples were established and supported by the local communities. They were managed by a committee that was responsible for the restoration and maintenance of the temple and organization of activities such as festivals. This committee also administered the possessions of the temple which often included vast extensions of land. As mentioned earlier, this land was usually leased out to residents of the neighborhood. The temple committee, besides dealing with religious issues, also responded to the collective needs of the neighborhood. It dealt with public matters, administrating justice and providing welfare (Porter 1990).

To become a member of a committee provided status. In general, only those who donated land or contributed large amounts of money were eligible to this position. Consequently, the temple committees were often, but not always,[6] formed by the local elite. Another aspect that might have enhanced the power of the temples was the fact that Chinese merchants, generally among the most powerful and rich persons, chose temples such as Lin Fong Miu and Ma Kok Miu to meet and discuss business matters.[7] Temples were commonly regarded as also constituting administrative centers rather than exclusive religious sites. One example is the case of the Three Streets Association (*Sám Kái Hui/San Jie Hui*) described by Gonzaga Gomes (cited in Teixeira 1979:512–14). The Three Streets Association was the earliest Chinese association established in Macao. It was founded by the shop owners of the first three commercial streets. The first president of the association managed to raise one thousand patacas that were spent in the construction of the temple that became the headquarters of the association. He also donated two apartments to the association so that their rent would become a fixed income of this association.

It seems that the religious sphere provided the arena for the local elite to express their leadership. The temple committees' political and economic power resulted from the fact that they did not limit themselves to manage the temples' properties and income, but went as far as administrating the affairs of the local community. Religious institutions were extremely important at two levels: first, they constituted the only organizations that effectively responded to the needs of the Chinese community in Macao and provided a sphere for the local elite to exercise its power; second, they constituted the link between the population and the Chinese state. Chinese officials resided in the temples and since these were the centers of both religious and secular authority they constituted an important means of control over the Chinese population.

By the end of the eighteenth century the Chinese merchant community saw its power grow and decided to move out of the temples and establish their own commercial trade-halls. In the middle of the nineteenth century a monopoly system was established by the government. A few wealthy Chinese and some Macanese controlled the trade of salt, opium, meat and had the monopoly of gambling and lottery.[8] This system provided the government with a significant amount of fixed income and enabled the Chinese elite to consolidate their position. They earned a great amount of capital that was then invested in other areas. They became major property owners, some created a "family" banks, and invested in trade.

With the consolidation of the economic power of the Chinese elite, the constitution of new associations, and the relocation of older associations from temples to new headquarters, temples saw their leading economic, political and administrative role decrease. They were no longer the path to power that they once were, both in terms of a privileged connection to the local elite and to the Chinese state. The fact that local temples lost their role as the link between the Chinese community and the state is not exclusively related to the consolidation of the colonial power. The reason behind the temples' loss of political preponderance has also to be sought in the policy and political changes in China, namely in "the attack directed against religious institutions during the late Qing modernizing reforms; . . . in the period immediately following the establishment of the Republic; during the May

Fourth era; and during the antisuperstition drive of the Nationalists in the late twenties" (Duara 1988:148).

These changes in policy since the beginning of this century in Mainland China led to a transformation of the religious domain—it ceased to incorporate the political element. Village elite refocused on more secular organizations that dealt with public affairs. The income from the temples lands was taken over by village councilors and, in 1931, a Nationalists proclamation required all temples lands to be registered as public property and permitted their use for official purposes (Duara 1988). The combination of these factors led to a decrease in the number of temples in China and to a diminishing role for religion in the villages' social life. In Macao a similar process of appropriation of religious property never took place, which allowed temples to keep some of their economic influence. However, since the late Qing modernization reforms, Chinese officials no longer regarded religious institutions as their privileged interlocutors in Macao. To become a member of a temple committee did not entail direct access to power but was still regarded as a prestigious position.

In the early fifties the first residents associations, or kaifongs (*jiefang*), were created in Macao.[9] These associations varied in size and importance, encompassing a single street or an entire neighborhood. They initially concentrated their efforts in providing welfare to the community and relief services in emergency situations such as the ones resulting from typhoons and fires. However, during the Cultural Revolution and especially since the so-called 1, 2, 3 riots in the late sixties, they assumed a political and administrative role.[10] Together with the Chinese language newspapers, they became instrumental for the Chinese communist authorities to influence local politics. In one of my interviews with the president of the Mong Há kaifong, he proudly stated that he had met Lu Ping in one of his trips to China. According to him "all the kaifongs' presidents make an annual trip to China paid by the Chinese authorities. We present a report of our activities and discuss plans for the following year."

Present-day kaifongs are, however, predominantly concerned with welfare and recreational activities, providing centers for the elderly and the youth, with settling

local disputes, and with helping to resolve individual problems. According to the president of a kaifong:

> people come to look for help whenever they have problems. Sometimes they need help with bureaucratic issues because most of the documents are in Portuguese and they do not understand. They do not know the procedures so we help them. Other times they need help with personal matters. We try to help everyone but we do not give financial support. If the person is unemployed we try to find him a job but we do not give any money. Besides this, we provide services to the neighborhood. We have an elderly center and we also organize recreational activities.

In a certain way, kaifongs now function as a bridge between the Chinese population and the Portuguese administration. Though their degree of political influence has diminished in the last years, in part due to the establishment of the New China News Agency (*Xinhua She*) that assumed this role, kaifongs still have a certain degree of political influence, especially through the Residents Associations General Union (*União Geral das Associações de Moradores*). This union represents the 24 kaifongs of the territory. The political power of this organization lies mainly in two aspects: first, in the fact that the Portuguese administration privileges contacts with it rather than with individual kaifongs; second and foremost, due to the fact that its president is concurrently a deputy in the legislative council. As the secretary of the Union argued, "because Mr. Leong is simultaneously the president of the Union and a deputy, if the Union has any problem he can help because he has an easier access to the government."

The transfer of political power from religious institutions to secular organizations such as kaifongs was eluded, in some cases, by the creation of neighborhood associations that were run by the neighborhoods' temple committees. Even now several associations are partially financed by a temple's income. One example is the Kun Iam Ku Miu.

The president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu committee is simultaneously the president of the Mong Há Residents Association, the neighborhood where the temple is located. I first discovered this when I decided to know whether there were any kind of relation between both Kun Iam temples located in this neighborhood and the residents association. I made an arrangement for an interview with the leader of that association. When I saw the president and realized that he was the person I had

interviewed as the president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu and that during our interview he had strongly argued that the temple committee did not have any connections nor received any support from the Mong Há Residents Association, I could not help to express my surprise. The president argued that the temple and the association were two different things and it just happened that they had the same president but they were not related in any way. When I asked whether other members of the temple committee also belonged to the residents association, he replied affirmatively but, once again insisted that they constituted two institutions with different purposes and different sources of income. But the emphasis on the dissociation between the temple and the kaifong is contradicted by the fact that they are being managed by the same body. Furthermore both institutions are perceived as intimately related. For example the leader of the Kun Iam Tong argued that the Kun Iam Ku Miu was managed by the Mong Há kaifong and that there were other similar cases in Macao.

The former president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu also managed both the temple and the association. This might indicate that the powerful people of the neighborhood decided to control a secular institution at the same time that they secured the control of a religious one. This accumulation of power allowed them to maintain their degree of local influence as well as their relationship with the P.R.C. officials. After all, it was the current president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu that claimed to have met Lu Ping and that he went annually to China to present reports of their activities. The need to stress systematically that the temple and the association are distinct institutions might be related to the awareness of the posture of the Chinese Communist Party towards religion.

The analysis of historical data reveals that the role played by the temples in Macao has been progressively altered due to transformations in the political, social, and economic context. Both in the colony and in Mainland China, temple committees were voided from their political power and saw their sphere of interference progressively restricted to the religious domain. This though did not always imply a transfer of power in terms of leadership. Temple committee members, aware of the political changes, opted in some cases to maintain their ascendancy towards the local population by simultaneously joining other organizations that saw their political power consolidated through the sponsorship of the P.R.C. officials.

5

Analysis of Two Temples

In the former chapter, I analyzed the historical background and recent political and economic changes that affect the role played by Chinese popular religion in Macao. A better understanding of the present situation, though, requires a more detailed analysis of religious activities and temple management. I conducted my research in two temples dedicated to Kun Iam that are located in the same neighborhood (see appendix 4). The reason that led me to choose these two temples was that, although dedicated to the same goddess, one temple's popularity has increased and it is now one of the, if not *the*, most important temples in Macao, while the other temple is decaying. The fact that temples, like businesses, can flourish or decay is not a particularity of Macao; it has been documented in Taiwan (Feuchtwang 1974; Sangren 1988) and Hong Kong (Hayes 1983) among other places. In Macao, the changes in the popularity and the role played by these institutions should be regarded as responses to specific political and economic changes. I chose these two temples because I consider that they are illustrative cases of the present situation in Macao.

eKun Iam Ku Miu—a Decaying Neighborhood Temple

The Mong Há area is located in the northern part of the peninsula and now belongs to the *Nossa Senhora de Fátima* district. The Mong Há village was one of the oldest populated areas of the territory and even at the beginning of this century constituted one of the largest Chinese neighborhoods. The Fukianese were the first to establish themselves in Mong Há, but it is difficult to determine with accuracy the time of their arrival. Some scholars argue that it was during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) (Porter 1990) while others believe it was during the first years of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) (Amaro 1967).

Although there is disagreement in terms of the exact period in which this village was established, scholars agree that in the first decades following the founding of the

village a shrine was built in honor of Kun Iam. According to the legend, a small wooden statue of Kun Iam was found floating in the river. The statue was brought to the village and a small shrine was built. This small shrine was later substituted by a proper temple that still exists in Macao—the Kun Iam Ku Miu. Over the centuries the temple was restored several times, especially when it was partially destroyed by natural disasters such as typhoons that abound in the region. By the end of the eighteenth century the temple was enlarged and two trees, that still exist, were planted on each side of its door. In 1867 the temple was once again enlarged with money donated by the residents of the neighborhood, as is testified in an engraved stele on the temple wall.

At the beginning of this century the governor Tamagnini Barbosa (1918–1919) decided to implement a project of urbanization of the Mong Há area. The governor got the support of influential Chinese and the project went ahead against the protests of local residents. Several properties were expropriated and not even the Kun Iam Ku Miu escaped. The building remained but its large courtyard was sacrificed to the construction of the Coronel Mesquita Avenue initiated in 1922 (see appendix 5) (Amaro 1967).

The Kun Iam Ku Miu was, in the first decades of this century, the center of the Mong Há neighborhood activities. All the people that were born in the neighborhood were more or less involved in its activities and were eligible to become committee members. Outsiders, people that had moved into the neighborhood but that were not born there, were automatically excluded. The temple was regarded as belonging to the neighborhood and donations for the temple restoration and maintenance were solicited from all the natives of the neighborhood. The temple committee besides running the temple and its properties was also involved in other activities such as providing welfare and other services to the local population. They were also involved in settling local disputes.

The present chairman of the temple committee is over eighty years old and has been running the temple for more than twenty years. According to him:

> in the past the temple was very important and all the people of the neighborhood came here to worship. Whenever there were problems, the committee would help the people to resolve them. Even now that less people come to the temple, we still have charity

activities, every year we visit the poor people and distribute clothes and if a poor person dies we pay for the coffin; besides we also run an elderly center for the people of this neighborhood.

The chairman was elected by the temple committee but the committee itself was elected by the local people. According to the chairman, "to be member of the committee they have to be residents in this area. They even have to be born in this neighborhood. A committee member has to be familiar with the local problems and the needs of the residents. He has to have a lot of experience." The process through which committee members are chosen by the residents is the following:

> We make announcements and then people come to the temple to vote. They write down, on a piece of paper the name of the person they choose and then all the pieces of paper are collected. The people who get more votes then become members of the committee. Before, more than one hundred years ago, the committee members were selected by tossing "moon-blocks," two pieces of wood that look like a moon but are round on one side and flat on the other. Those who got the right side, that is one flat and one round side down, more often, were elected. But this is not done any more.

In 1954 the Mong Há Residents Association was created. Some of the issues previously handled by the temple committee started to be dealt with by the association. While charity activities remained a major concern of the temple committee, issues concerning the settlement of disputes and other politicized matters started to be handled by the residents association. The association's aim was to represent the population and defend its interests. What is interesting is that this association was formed by the committee members of the Kun Iam Ku Miu. This, I argue, resulted from the diminishing political power of the religious organization and the perception that a residents association would constitute a more efficient way of mobilizing this power and, very importantly, of obtaining the support of the new Chinese authorities, the Chinese Communist Party.

During my interview with the chairman of the association he openly stressed the political role of the association. He argued that they were "pro-China" and were there to defend the interests of the people of the neighborhood. He commented on the meetings he attends annually with the Chinese authorities but he claimed that "now the association is not so important because there are other more powerful organizations and there is the Residents Association General Union. The government

prefers to deal directly with the Union. Now we only have three hundred members, but in the sixties and the seventies we had many more members and were more active." Evidence of the political nature of this involvement can be found in the Hong Kong Miu (*Kang Gong Miao*).[1] This temple was closed down a few years ago because of the low number of worshippers and the lack of funds to proceed with restoration work. The temple is managed by the Mong Há Residents Association and since its closure it has served as a storage room. When the temple was shown to me by the president it was filled with placards with pro-China slogans piled up against the walls. These placards had been stored in the facilities of the association but were moved to the temple when it closed down. According to the president these signs belong to the residents association and were used during the late sixties and early seventies, especially during the period of the 1, 2, 3 riots.

The diminishing relevance of neighborhood organizations such as the neighborhood temple and the residents association might be linked, among other factors, to the enormous migration wave that affected the territory since the sixties. In 1960, there were 169,299 residents in the territory. In 1970 this number had increased to 248,636, which represents a growth of nearly 50 percent. In 1991 there were, according to the census, 355,693 persons, meaning that in thirty years the number of persons residing in Macao has more than doubled (see appendix 6). This wave of newcomers was bound to affect neighborhoods that were previously populated by people born in Macao and that, for the most part, had lived all their lives in the same area. The number of newcomers, instead of constituting a marginal part of the population, rose to a significant number. Neighborhood organizations saw their roles questioned. They would cease to be regarded as legitimate representatives of the neighborhood if the new residents were not represented. This led some local organizations to change their policy and to eliminate the clause claiming that only people that were born in Macao and had lived all their life in the neighborhood could become members of the organization. This happened with the Mong Há Residents Association. While in the beginning the acceptance of membership was tied to the fact that one had been born in Macao and lived in the Mong Há neighborhood, in the sixties the association started to accept as members some mainland Chinese immigrants that had established themselves in the neighborhood.

Such a rapid increase in the population deeply affected local organizations. They had to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. But they were faced with the impossibility, even when they tried to adapt and integrate the new residents, of maintaining their influence. Newcomers were less concerned with local issues and less prone to seek help from these organizations. Furthermore, the growth of the population plus the increase in the standard of living has led to a higher degree of mobility within the territory. Whenever people secure a better income they tend to move to more prestigious neighborhoods. According to the residents association president: "before, people born in this neighborhood remained here all their life. They had their family and friends here. But now it is different, people move a lot. Most of the present residents were not born here."

Institutions whose power relied on the management of local affairs and on the support of the local residents saw their foundations shattered. This also applied to neighborhood temples. First, they saw their sphere of influence circumscribed, they were no longer the center of the local political, administrative, and economic activities. Second, they saw the number of worshippers decrease which entailed a significant loss of income that jeopardized some temples' survival.

The case of the Kun Iam Ku Miu illustrates this situation. The number of worshippers has steadily declined in the last decades. According to the president of the temple committee, an average of only ten to fifteen persons go daily to the temple when an estimated forty thousand people live in the Mong Há area. The majority of the worshippers are old women that have been going to this temple all their life. The total revenue of the temple hardly covers its expenses, namely the salaries of the workers. The remaining income is not enough to cover the costs of restoration work and it is spent in charity activities. Another factor that shows the lack of neighborhood support and involvement with this religious institution is the temple committee's incapacity to raise locally the funds needed for the restoration work. This temple has therefore to rely on the government's willingness to subsidize the work. The government, though, has its own agenda; as explained earlier, although this temple was one of the earliest built in the territory (and is therefore labeled historical building and eligible for subvention), major temples come first.

The future of the Kun Iam Ku Miu does not seem very bright. The majority of the committee members are over sixty years old, its president is over eighty years old. The temple keeper, the fortune-teller and the other two workers of the temple are also elderly people. When these people pass away who is going to take their places? The number of worshippers is continuously declining. If the new generations find the Kun Iam Tong more appealing, who is going to worship Kun Iam in the old neighborhood temple? If there are no worshippers where will the temple's revenue come from? If the government does not assume as its responsibility the preservation of the temple who is going to prevent it from falling apart as has already happened with other temples?

Kun Iam Tong—a Flourishing Temple

The Buddhist monastery P'ou Tchai Sin Ün was built in the beginning of the seventeenth century[2] a few hundred meters away from the Kun Iam Ku Miu. The monks of this monastery decided to build a small temple dedicated to Kun Iam. The first "leader" of the temple was the Tai San monk, born in Jiangxi province (Huang 1991). According to Huang, it was under his supervision that the temple was built to its present size. In the following centuries the temple was restored several times but its characteristics remained similar. The last restoration work was conducted in 1992 and was subsidized by the Cultural Institute of Macao. The temple however employs permanent workers that, together with the monks, perform minor works and are responsible for the daily maintenance of the temple.

As mentioned earlier, the Kun Iam Temple was the center of religious and secular activities. An assistant judge was lodged in this temple and whenever other Chinese officials visited the territory they sojourned in the monastery. This official endorsement of the temple contributed to enhance its status among the Chinese community. Another evidence of its secular role is given by the fact that the temple was chosen as the site for the signature of the first Sino-American treaty that became known as the Wang Xia[3] treaty (Teixeira 1979:187). This treaty followed the Anglo-Chinese treaty ceding Hong Kong to Britain. The Americans wanted to secure commercial rights similar to the ones obtained by the British in the Nanjing treaty.

The treaty was signed on July 3, 1844, on a stone table that can still be seen in the temple's garden, by the Viceroy of Canton, Ki Ying, and the Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the United States of America, Caleb Cushing.

The role played by the Kun Iam Tong exceeded the limits of the neighborhood, being of importance to all the Chinese residents of the territory. On the other hand the Kun Iam Ku Miu was definitely a neighborhood temple, serving the local population and being administered by an elected committee of local residents. The Kun Iam Tong is also managed by a committee constituted by prestigious Chinese, but the majority of them are not residents in the Mong Há neighborhood. In practice, to become a committee member of this temple entails a honorary status rather than an effective participation in the management activities. As the monk that is running the temple strongly states: "yes there is a committee but I am the president and I have been running this temple for sixteen years. I became the president when my master died, but actually I have been in charge of this temple for thirty years. When my master was old he delegated everything to me."

While the committee president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu does not have the power to take decisions single-handedly, the monk running the Kun Iam Tong seems to have concentrated the decision-making power into his own hands. The monk's power is further reinforced by the fact that this temple, in contrast to the Kun Iam Ku Miu, has a considerable number of worshippers and a considerable source of income. The temple has twelve permanent workers and ten monks. Each member of the temple's staff is in charge of a specific activity. In the main hall there is one counter for the fortune-teller and another counter where an old man sells paper offerings and incense. There are also two other persons in charge of cleaning the room and assisting the worshippers. Four members of the staff are in charge of the other two secondary halls and the rest of the staff is dispersed around the memorial halls that contain ancestral tablets.

According to the leader of the temple, "there are ten monks living in the monastery. Some of them do not live here all the time because according to the tradition, monks should travel around and stay in different monasteries or temples. So some of them do that, but at the same time we also receive monks for a short period

of time." Each day the monks do their morning and evening prayers and read scripts on their own. But they also help in some activities such as maintenance work. During the open hours of the temple there are one or two monks assigned to perform religious rituals when required. In the words of the leader of the temple, "there is always, at least, one monk on duty." When a devotee requires a service that cannot be accomplished by either the fortune-teller or one of the temple keepers, the fortune-teller calls the monk on duty using a loudspeaker. As one monk explained to me: "we perform rituals in the memory of ancestors, make blessings and pray on birthdays and weddings." Special celebrations, such as the four festivals in honor of Kun Iam,[4] are conducted by the monk that is running the temple.

The temple's sources of income are varied. One steady source of revenue comes from the temple's properties that are leased out and from temple's investments. Another source of revenue comes from worshippers' donations. Besides that, whenever the services of the fortune-teller or of one monk are required a fee is paid. This fee can amount to a few patacas, in the case of the fortune-teller, or go up to a few hundreds when a special ceremony is performed by a monk. Memorial halls, where ancestral tablets are placed, also constitute a major source of income that should not be disregarded. In the Kun Iam Temple there are three rooms destined for ancestral tablets. I do not know the exact amount that is paid for the privilege of depositing ancestral tablets in the temple. Whenever I inquired about this subject, or issues related with the temple's income, the answers were always evasive: "I do not know," "it depends," "I am not sure." According to one article published in a Hong Kong daily (Eastern Express, 7 April 1995), the *Màhn Móuh* (*Wen Wu*) temple in Hong Kong charges between HK$8,000 and HK$180,000 for one slot for ancestral tablets. Increasing prices seem to be proving part of the attraction for the status-conscious descendants. As the Chinese Temples Committee assistant secretary said to the journalist, prices are linked with prestige: "[Chinese people] want to buy 'face' for themselves . . . if they buy a cheap place they would be scolded by relatives saying they are trying to save money from the dead."

The increasing demand for slots in the temple halls is, according to this article, also linked to the fact that the services provided by the temple guarantee worship for families who are emigrating or who lack space or time to pay daily respects. Another

aspect that should be taken into consideration is the fact that burial grounds in Hong Kong have become extremely scarce and expensive. In Macao, although the cost of living is lower and burial grounds do not reach the price of those in Hong Kong, to acquire one still requires a large sum of money. This affects the price of a place in the temple to deposit the ancestral tablets. This would mean that the ancestral halls of the Kun Iam Tong constitute a rich source of revenue for the temple since, it is important to emphasize, this money does not go to any charity fund. In Hong Kong the fees charged by most temples for depositing ancestral tablets are donated to the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals.

The selling of religious paraphernalia is still another source of income far more significant than one might suspect. From the information that I could gather, the profit made on each of the items sold is around one hundred and fifty percent. For example, one piece of "coiled incense" that costs the temple MOP$40 is sold to the worshippers for MOP$100.

In this temple there are several counters where the workers of the temple sell a huge diversity of articles. One can buy "coiled incense," "lotus flower-shape candles," paper money, joss sticks, statues of Kun Iam and other gods, Buddhist bracelets, and so on. One day I decided to count some of the items that had been bought and offered to the gods. I counted the number of "coiled incense" hanging from the ceiling of the temple and the number of lotus flower-shape candles displayed in front of the altars and ancestral tablets. I multiplied the total number of items by their respective price and found out that the total sum of money spent amounted to MOP$21,720. Taking into consideration that these items take several hours to burn completely (in average forty-eight hours) and supposing that the number of items donated throughout the month are approximately the same, this would mean that the total income exclusively generated by the selling of these two items would round MOP$320,000 per month.

I must confess that what first led me to count the number of items was pure curiosity. Though, when I added up and realized the amount of money involved and that it only constituted a minimal part of the total monthly revenue of the temple, I was astonished. The relevance of this particular data is debatable and a more

thorough study is needed as well as access to the temple's accounts. However, this data indicates that the Kun Iam Temple monthly income amounts at least to several hundred thousand patacas.

As mentioned earlier, there is no institution in Macao with similar functions to the Hong Kong Chinese Temples Committee. Macao's temples are not under government control. The way their revenue is used concerns exclusively the temple committee. This liberal policy has allowed particularly popular temples to thrive economically. In some cases, like the one of the Kun Iam Tong, we could even say that they resemble profit-making enterprises since income is not being directed to charity activities. According to the monk running the Kun Iam Temple, they are not supporting any kind of charity activities, they have not opened centers to assist the population (as the Kun Iam Ku Miu did) but they opened a Buddhist school in Hong Kong in 1989, the Buddhist Wai Yan Memorial College. The expenses of the temple cannot be very high since most of its staff is constituted by elderly people receiving a low salary. Furthermore, since this temple is considered an important historical building (it is frequently referred to in tourist brochures as the largest and most significant temple in Macao), it can always rely on governmental support when it needs costly restoration works. This subject deserves a more extensive analysis. An exact evaluation of the temple's finances would require access to the temple's accounts, list of properties and temple's investments, in other words to all sources of income and temple's expenses.

Temple management seems though to be involved in great secrecy. Temple's accounts are confidential information and access to it seems to be limited to the people directly involved in the management activities. This would not be surprising if we were speaking of a privately held company but it is important not to forget that this is a religious institution. When I first met the leader of the Kun Iam Temple I asked his permission to conduct research in the premises of the temple. His first reply was that I could do it but whenever I had questions I should ask him directly and not the members of the staff. I argued that since he was a very busy person, he probably would not have the time to explain me the ceremonies being performed and to answer all my questions. He finally acceded to let me interview the staff but only on religious issues. When I first interviewed the fortune-teller, I asked him, among other things,

whether he was born in Macao and he immediately replied that this was not a religious issue and therefore refused to reply. After I spent many days in the temple, some members of the staff became more friendly and cooperative. They told stories of their past, explained their work and some of the ceremonies being performed, and commented on some of the issues I raised. But I always had the impression that they had been told of my presence by the leader of the temple and instructed on the kind of information they could provide.

The level of secrecy involved does not only affect the management of the temple but also the degree of power of its leader. When I mentioned the leader of the Kun Iam Tong to several persons, their immediate reply was that he is a very powerful person. Two persons interviewed even commented that he is a "*jiu rou heshang*," arguing that "he is not a real monk, he is more like a businessman." His being commonly regarded as a very powerful person is further attested by the fact that he was invited by the P.R.C. Religious Affairs Bureau, together with six representatives of other religions, to attend the commemorations of the National Day on October 1, 1994 (*Va Kio*, 28 September 1994).

When one discusses temples and Chinese religious activity in Macao, the temples that immediately come to one's mind are the Kun Iam Tong, the Ma Kok Miu and the Lin Fong Temple. All of them have a long and significant history and they constitute the largest temples in Macao. Two of them, the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Miu, attract the highest number of worshippers in the territory. Surprisingly though, few people know that all these temples are managed by the same person—the monk that is running the Kun Iam Temple. Although he usually presents himself, and is referred to, as the leader of the Kun Iam Tong, in practice all three temples are under his leadership.

I discovered this accidentally, since none of the persons that I had interviewed ever mentioned this fact. In one of my visits to the Lin Fong Temple I explained to the temple keeper the nature of my research and asked to speak with the person in charge of the temple. He replied that he was not there and that it was easier to find him in the Kun Iam Tong since he was also in charge of this temple and spent most of his time there. Later, in one of my meetings with the leader of the Kun Iam Temple, I

asked him whether he had any relations with the Lin Fong Temple. He replied that "in Macao all temple are managed individually, there is no general organization but we all know each other. The only relation between the Lin Fong and the Kun Iam is that both are Buddhist temples." I then asked whether he was the leader of the Lin Fong Temple. He seemed very surprised but confirmed that he was in charge of the Lin Fong Temple. On the course of the conversation I commented on the importance of both temples and inquired whether he was the leader of any other temple. To my enormous surprise he said that he was also the leader of the Ma Kok Miu.

If the Ma Kok Miu, the Kun Iam Tong and the Lin Fong Miu (*Lianfeng Miao*) are being managed by one single person this means that this person has the monopoely of the profitable and historically most significant temples in Macao. Why is it then that this is not common knowledge? Why did the monk not want to disclose this important information? Why is the temple management involved in such secrecy? One possible explanation is that first, the monk does not want to be perceived as the powerful person he is. He might be concerned that this would raise suspicion or lead the government to interfere somehow in the way these temples are being managed. Second, and most important, he seems to be aware that if these temples are perceived by the worshippers as profit making, they risk to loose their popularity. Discretion, then, is the best policy and this would explain his refusal to allow temple workers to discuss non-religious matters with me.

The fact that the leader of the Kun Iam Tong is managing two other temples must be, according to historical data, relatively recent. When the committee of the Ma Kok Miu decided to register as a benevolent association on July 17, 1926 (see *Boletim Oficial* in appendix 7), it stated in section 10 of the statute of the association, that a monk would be hired. This monk should come from the Kun Iam Tong to perform religious services and be responsible for the maintenance of the temple. It is also determined that this monk is under the authority of the committee and that his services can, at any moment, be suspended if the committee disapproves of his conduct. This means that it was only in the mid-twenties that monks from the Kun Iam Tong started to have access to the Ma Kok Miu. In the beginning, though, their power was limited and they had to comply to the authority of the committee running the temple. A reversal of power, when the monk became more powerful than the

committee itself, must have taken place either when the monk Kei Tai Si was running the Kun Iam Tong or later when his successor, the present leader, assumed this function.

Although it is not possible to determine with certitude who was the first monk to secure the management of the three temples, I am inclined to believe that this occurred under the present leadership. This seems to be indicated by the fact that, although the committee of the Kun Iam Ku Miu has registered as a benevolent association in 1928 (see *Boletim Oficial* in appendix 8), it was only in 1993 (see appendix 9) that the temple was registered in the Lands Department (*Conservatória do Registo Predial*). The decision to have the Kun Iam Ku Miu registered resulted from the perception that the increasing power of the leader of the Kun Iam Tong constituted a menace to the temple committee. To have the temple registered as property of the Kun Iam Ku Miu Piety and Benevolent Association (*Associação de Piedade e Beneficiência Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio*) was the only official means available to try to secure the committee's leadership.[5] According to the president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu committee "that monk is too powerful and he could have tried to become also the president of the Kun Iam Ku Miu. He could even attempt to control the Mong Há kaifong. People would oppose him but he is very powerful."

In brief, we can find in present-day Macao two types of temples. On one hand we have the small neighborhood temple whose role as the center of the community activities has steadily diminished but still responds to the needs of a small percentage of the community, primarily elderly people and neighborhood natives. On the other hand, we have three major temples that are being managed by one single person. As mentioned earlier, two of these temples, namely the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Miu, attract a high number of worshippers and are, seemingly, highly profitable temples.

What are the reasons behind the cleavage between neighborhood and major temples? Why did neighborhood temples saw the number of worshippers decrease while the two major temples become more and more popular? I contend that the fact

that neighborhood temples have lost their preponderance results from a combination of factors. First, they no longer constitute the center of the social, political, and economic activities. Second, the enormous wave of immigrants that has reached the territory since the sixties and the increasing standard of living which has led to higher mobility within the territory lessen the relevance of neighborhood organizations.

This, *per se*, does not explain, though, the popularity of major temples. The decreasing saliency of neighborhood communities coincided with the emergence of a pan-Macao identity. Neighborhood affiliations are no longer relevant. Temples like the Kun Iam Tong and the Ma Kok Miu that are not bound to neighborhood communities came therefore to symbolize a territory-wide identity. A similar phenomenon was reported to be occurring in Taiwan. According to Jordan (1994:157): "higher mobility in Taiwan brought a diminution in the importance of district divinities, once the mainstay of popular cults. As this occurs, we are probably seeing the emergence of island-wide cults that, being both restricted to Taiwan and general to it, will come to symbolize a cultural identity distinctive to residents of Taiwan." In Macao, the fact that major temples are becoming symbols of a pan-Macao identity was indirectly further reinforced by the government. The Macao Government Tourist Office uses images of the Ma Kok Miu and the Kun Iam Tong as symbols of the territory.

Neighborhood temples no longer fulfill the needs of the population and their continuity in the future is surely in jeopardy. Major temples see their number of worshippers increase and with the collaboration and direct support of the government seem to have a bright future.

6

Kun Iam: Worshippers, History and Belief

Until now I have dealt with temple organization and management. But to fully understand why some temples thrive and become popular while others see the number of worshippers and public support decrease, it is also important to look at the community of worshippers. What are the characteristics of worshippers? Why do they go to the temple? What do they pray for? What is their knowledge about Kun Iam?

Kun Iam Tong Worshippers

I conducted a survey to draw a profile of the worshippers and to attempt to answer these questions. Together with a research assistant, I interviewed sixty persons in the courtyard of the Kun Iam Temple during the month of November, 1994 (see questionnaire in appendix 10). The survey was carried out both on weekdays and on weekends. This kind of survey has its limitations: first, the people interviewed were chosen casually and were not part of a carefully drawn sample. Second, the interviews were carried out during one single month, which means that some of the people who only go to the temple during major celebrations, such as the Lunar New Year, were not represented. Due to these limitations it is not possible to make generalizations on the total population of worshippers in Macao. Despite all these problems, this kind of survey gives us important information and helps us to draw a profile of the worshippers. Further, the results obtained were in most cases consistent with the information provided by different temple keepers when characterizing the worshippers that visited the temples where they worked.[1]

Since this study deals with issues of religion and ethnic identity, I wanted to find out whether religion played an important role in boundary building between the Chinese natives from Macao and recent immigrants. According to the results of the survey, 52 percent of the people interviewed were born in Macao, while 40 percent were born in Mainland China. Of the people born in Mainland China, 52 percent

came to Macao less than fifteen years ago. Since 40 percent of the overall population of the territory were born in Macao while 50 percent were born in Mainland China, the results indicate that people born in Macao tend to go more to the temples than mainland immigrants. However, the percentage of immigrants that engage in religious activity is also high. That coincides with the perception of the people interviewed, regardless of whether they were worshippers, temple leaders or temple keepers. The common response was that going or not to temples was the result of an individual choice that had nothing to do with fact that the person was or was not born in Macao. So, contrary to my expectations, religion is not drawn upon as a feature that differentiates Chinese born in Macao from those born in Mainland China.

In terms of place of residence, the survey shows that 69 percent of the respondents live in the Mong Há area. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of the interviews were carried out on working days. If we look at the interviews made during weekends, the proportions are reversed; 70 percent of the people interviewed come from other neighborhoods. Furthermore, only 38 percent of all the respondents cited proximity as the reason for going to this particular temple. It can be argued that the temple is not exclusively the focus of worship of the Mong Há residents. Although a similar survey was not carried out in the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the information gathered points to the fact that neighborhood residents constitute a large majority of the worshippers in this temple. According to the temple keeper of the Kun Iam Ku Miu "the people that come to the temple are people who have lived in Mong Há for a long time, their mothers and even their grandmothers used to come here so they also come. I know most of them because I have been working here for a long time. Sometimes a tourist comes, but not very often." This information was further confirmed by the president of this temple's committee.

In terms of socio-economic status, 55 percent of the people interviewed were either housewives (35 percent), students (12 percent), unemployed or retired (8 percent). The other respondents were either skilled or unskilled workers (20 percent), or white-collar workers (13 percent). The remaining 10 percent (six persons) of the interviewees said it was "not convenient" to reveal their occupation. They were all male and their age varied between twenty and forty-seven years old. They constituted 27 percent of the male population interviewed. The exact significance of this data is

difficult to determine; more in depth research is needed. But, keeping in mind that gambling and gambling related activities are the major source of income of the territory, and the fact that the majority of these men were well dressed and wore gold or jade jewelry (it is, therefore, unlikely that they belong to the group of illegal immigrants) we can speculate that these people might be involved in less legal activities. However, this is an issue that definitely requires further research.

The survey indicates that women are more likely to go to temples than men, which is in accordance with the findings of similar studies (see Lang and Ragvald 1993). Sixty-five percent of the people interviewed were female. This is in conformity with my own observations and with the opinion expressed by several temple keepers. The fact that more females go to the temples than males is explained by a variety of factors. First, only 20 percent of the women interviewed have a job, while 54 percent of the male do. Since a high percentage of the women are housewives they have more time available to go to the temple and engage in religious activities. Second, women tend to worship on behalf of their households; some specifically said that they ask for success in studies for sons and daughters, for help in the work of their husbands, for the health of their parents and in-laws and for the prosperity of the family as a whole. In a certain way we could say that the responsibility of carrying out the religious activities both within the household and in the temples seems to be delegated to women, usually the wife. Third, since the temple is devoted to a female deity,[2] it appeals more to women. Kun Iam is the goddess of mercy and compassion, and though she works for the salvation of all beings, she is often perceived as concerned with pregnancy, childbirth and the health of children. Thirty-three percent of the women, and 19 percent of the men, interviewed claimed to worship only Kun Iam. The proportion of male worshippers goes against the conception of Kun Iam as too specialized and predominantly worshipped by women (Lang and Ragvald 1993:87)

Let us now turn to another feature of the worshippers' profile—age. In this survey all ages are represented, with an equal proportion of young people (those aged 25 or below) and older people (those aged 50 or above), both representing 18 percent of the respondents. Those aged between 25 and 50 represented 63 percent of the respondents. The percentage of people above 50 years of age in this survey is remarkably low compared with the data provided by two surveys conducted in Hong

Kong (see Lang and Ragvald 1993:80–81, and appendix 11). In Hong Kong, the percentage of people over 50 years old going to the Wong Tai Sin temple are in one survey 35.2 percent and in the other 27.7 percent. The reason why people over 50 are less represented in Macao's temple worshippers can be partially sought in the fact that this group age is less represented in Macao's overall population but also in the fact that elderly people in Macao prefer to go to their neighborhood temple. In many cases they have been going to the same temple for several decades and are reluctant to change. According to the temple keeper of the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the majority of the worshippers are middle age and elderly people. This seems to point out a major difference, in Macao, between neighborhood temples and major temples in terms of age group representation.

Another important issue is how often believers go to the temple. According to this survey more than half of the worshippers go quite frequently to the temple: 27 percent reported going to the temple at least once a week and 33 percent once a month. The other worshippers interviewed claimed to go two to four times a year (28 percent) or just once a year (12 percent). When I compared these results with the ones provided by the surveys conducted in Hong Kong's Wong Tai Sin temple (Lang and Ragvald 1993:83), I was astonished by the dissimilarity I found (see appendix 11). While more than half of the worshippers interviewed in the Kun Iam Tong go frequently to the temple, 76 percent to 83 percent of the Hong Kong worshippers surveyed only go to the temple three times per year or less. It is not easy to explain this finding based on the data available. However, I would like to suggest that the highest degree of engagement in religious activity (revealed by the frequency of visits to the temple) might be linked to the fact that life in Macao is less busy than in Hong Kong and consequently people have more time to go to the temples. Another related aspect is the fact that the small dimension of the territory enables people to have easy and rapid access to the temples. Most important, though, this data suggests that in Macao temple-visiting plays an important role in the life of the worshippers. A significant percentage of them will go to the temple whenever they have problems, need advice or want to thank the gods and not only during the Lunar New Year or other major celebrations.

Another related question raised in the survey was: "Why did you choose this particular temple?" Thirty-eight percent of the people cited proximity, 27 percent claimed that friends or family members had recommended this temple, 20 percent said because it was big and 17 percent because it was famous. The fact that recommendation, by family members or friends, is the second cited reason suggests that this is a popular temple. Further, the claim that one goes to a specific temple because it is big can be interpreted differently: by big one might mean physically large or one might employ big as a synonymous of famous—as some of the respondents argued that "it is a very big temple, everyone knows it and most people come here to worship or go to the Ma Kok Miu." All these factors suggest that the majority of people choose this temple because it is regarded as "famous" or "popular," and not because it is the temple in their neighborhood or the temple that they, and their parents, have been visiting to worship for decades.

The majority of the people interviewed reported going to the temple to worship (78 percent) while 12 percent claimed to go to consult the fortune-teller. Worshippers ask and petition the gods for different things. The most common appeal concerns health (58 percent) and is immediately followed by the request for peace (sometimes specified as peace of mind) and happiness (42 percent). Twenty-eight percent ask for luck; luck in their studies, careers, love relations and gambling. Nine persons, representing 15 percent of the respondents, claimed that they petition the gods for wealth. Three of these said that they petitioned *Chòih Sàhn* (*Cai Shen*), the god of wealth, another three claimed to petition all the gods, while two mention that they petitioned Kun Iam. It is interesting to note, though, that several of the respondents emphasized that "Kun Iam helps the poor and the needy, she can answer their call for health and peace, but not for money." In order to better understand believers' petitions to Kun Iam, it is important to know more about this goddess and how she is perceived by the worshippers.

Kun Iam: History and Belief

To those enmeshed in litigation
Or trembling in the midst of hosts
There comes the thought of Kuan Yin's power,
Whereat all hatred is dispersed.

The mysterious sound of Kuan Yin's name
Is holy like the ocean's thunder—
No other like it in the world!
And therefore should we speak it often.

Call upon it, never doubting,
Kuan Shih Yin—sound pure and holy;
To those who stand in mortal fear
A never-wavering support.

To the perfection of her merits,
To the compassion in her glance,
To the infinitude of her blessings,
Worshipping, we bow our heads!
[Blofeld 1977:108]

Kun Iam is the most popular Chinese female deity and has been worshipped in China for more than one thousand years. Several temples in Macao are devoted to this goddess and those that are devoted to other gods frequently have a side altar dedicated to Kun Iam. Further, her image can also be found in many domestic shrines. Her proper name "Kuan Shih Yin [sic] . . . means She-Who-Hearkens-to-the-Cries-of-the-World, and is a translation of the Sanskrit name of her chief progenitor Avalokitésvara (or Avalokita)" (Blofeld 1977:17). Kun Iam was originally identical with Avalokitésvara and therefore conceived as possessing male characteristics. Some scholars believe that the change in sex—the transformation of the Indic male divinity Avalokitésvara to the Chinese female divinity Kun Iam, occurred only after a legendary Chinese princess Miao Shan became associated with this divinity around 1100 years ago (Sangren 1983).[3]

There are several versions of the Miao Shan legend but, with a few variations, they tell the same story. Briefly the Miao Shan legend is the story of a king who had three daughters and no male descendent. He sought husbands for his three daughters, but the youngest princess defied his wish and refused to marry. She retreated to a Buddhist monastery to engage in a life of contemplation. Her father became very angry, accused her of lack of filial piety and (according to some versions of the legend) had her killed. The princess Miao Shan descended into hell where her true identity as Kun Iam was revealed (according to some versions it was only later that her identity was revealed), and by the power of her purity succeeded in having the

suffering souls released. She then returned to earth and assumed the guise of a mountain recluse.

From this point onward different versions of the legend recount distinct events (Blofeld 1977). According to one version, she received a visit from Amitäbha Buddha and he advised her to seek safety on the island of P'u-t'o (sic). During the following nine years, the princess spent her time meditating and performing deeds of compassion which, together with the merit previously achieved enabled her to attain the status of Boddhisattva. Some years later, she returned to her country and converted her father and mother. Another version tells a different story; after returning to earth, she heard about her father's illness. She made a magic potion with her arms and eyes which saved her father. However, she became miraculously whole again and entered nirvana.

It is not possible to determine whether the appearance of this legend is linked to the gender transformation of the deity. According to Blofeld: "It is possible that confusion in the popular mind between Bodhisattvas and local gods or goddesses permitted Miao Shan, a legendary Chinese princess with extraordinary compassion, to become assimilated to Kuan Yin [Kun Iam], but personally I doubt if this assimilation took place until after the Bodhisattva had come to be regarded as female" (1977:39). He further argues that:

> The Chinese have always been disposed to envisage friendly divinities in idealized human form . . . they do not feel at home with the multi-armed and multi-headed representations so dear to the Indian heart. . . . To the humanistic Chinese, such forms were alien and unsuited to the portrayal of the yearning compassion a mother feels for her child. The lovely Tara, appearing now as a sweet-faced matron, now as a winsome maiden, would seem infinitely more appealing to the Chinese mind. For religious reasons, Chinese Buddhists could hardly reject (!) worship of the Boddhisattva Avalokita; on the other hand, since the forms taken by deities depend somewhat upon the meditator and the artist, there could be no objection to visualizing Avalokita in a form similar to Tara's; and, if that were done, what need of both embodiments? So the two became one, thus preparing the way for the assimilation of Princess Miao Shan—a compassionate being enjoying the rank of goddess. [ibid.:41]

Blofeld further consolidates his argument by demonstrating that early Kun Iam iconography presents features that are commonly associated with Tara. But, regardless of the reasons that are behind the gender transformation, Kun Iam is now

perceived as a female deity. Kun Iam is the embodiment of pure compassion and wisdom, her miraculous powers can instantly avert danger and affliction from any human being that calls upon her. There are several passages in the sutras which claim that those who call upon her name with great sincerity and recite her mantra from their heart will surely be reborn in her sacred Potala and there they will be taught how to achieve enlightenment.

Kun Iam is worshipped by millions of people but the way in which she is perceived, and the devotees' knowledge about her, vary. Many Kun Iam devotees belong to the Pure Land Buddhist Sect; they know that she is a Boddhisattva and they study the Mahayana sutras. However, the great majority of the worshippers knows little about the doctrines, revere Kun Iam as a goddess rather than a Boddhisattva, and love her in an uncomplicated manner. They see in her the protective power and rewarding nature of the compassion.

During the interviews the fact that struck me most was the respondents' general lack of knowledge about the goddess. I asked the following questions: "What do you know about Kun Iam?", "What kind of help does the goddess provide?" To my surprise, 37 percent of the worshippers (48 percent of the male respondents and 31 percent of the female ones) replied that they knew nothing specific about this goddess. The other respondents gave simple responses such as: "Kun Iam is very kind, she helps the needy people," "she teaches us to love and help the others," "my mother told me that before she was a man but then she became a kind goddess," "Kun Iam became a goddess because she was so kind to her wicked father. She helped him when he needed it, and she helps all those in need," and so on. When speaking about the goddess, the most common attributes or facts mentioned were: kindness (mentioned 23 times), helpfulness in general, and in particular to the needy (17 times). Five persons referred that Kun Iam was a male, and three that she was ill-treated by her father. Among the respondents, nine persons emphasized that Kun Iam was an ordinary person before, but due to her good actions and kindness became a goddess.

It is interesting to note that the great majority of the respondents argue that the goddess will help everyone, though some stress that she will not help people to earn

money, for example giving tips for the races or other gambling activities. The fact that she is generally perceived by the worshippers as the "listener-of-all-cries", the helper of the needy and the poor, contradicts Lang and Ragvald's presupposition that Kun Iam is a specialized goddess, appealing to women and being particularly efficacious in cases linked to pregnancies, health of mother and child, and so forth (1993:87). Although it is most probable that a believer who wishes to have a male son, for example, will seek the help of Kun Iam and appeal to her power, Kun Iam is commonly portrayed as a goddess who has devoted herself to the rescue of all suffering beings. As one of the worshippers stated: "she will help all those who appeal to her with a pure heart."

Worshippers perceive the goddess as providing supernatural aid and protection and as a source of advice whenever they face problems. However, there is also a moral dimension in the worship of Kun Iam. Most of the worshippers insist on the fact that Kun Iam advocates certain moral principles, she teaches people to be kind and help the others, and those who follow her teachings will attain peace of mind. Worshippers' relationship with the goddess is unconstrained and easy, they believe that there are no specific requirements and that one does not have to know the doctrines to have access to the goddess. If one appeals to Kun Iam, the goddess will surely listen to his request.

7

Relevance of Ritual Practices in Reinforcing Ethnic Identities

After several interviews I started to realize that the lack of knowledge about the goddess could not be exclusively ascribed to a few individuals. In fact, it seemed to be common to the majority of the worshippers. Each believer had its more or less individual perception of the goddess and her powers. They did not feel embarrassed to state publicly that they knew nothing or very little about Kun Iam, just that she was kind and would help those who need it. For them, what was really important was to worship her and present their offerings of incense and food. The emphasis lies on doing the rituals in the proper way. During the time I spent in the temple, I often saw some people instructing others on how to accomplish the rituals properly. One time it was a grandmother explaining to her granddaughter how to shake the fortune sticks out of the container; another time it was a Chinese lady explaining to a foreigner how to properly place the incense; another a father telling his son how many times he should bow. What each person knows or believes about the goddess does not seem to be as important as the necessity to perform the rites in a proper way.

We could say that, in contrast to Christians, the emphasis is put on ritual rather than belief. The majority of the Chinese in Macao have shrines in their houses and in working places such as shops or factories (Brito Peixoto 1988). Some go frequently to the temples, others only for major celebrations such as the Lunar New Year. Ritual practices such as lighting incense for ancestors and the kitchen god, burning paper money, and so on, are an integral part of daily life. As one Chinese explained to me, "First we feed our ancestors and then we can eat." These ritual practices are so blended with their daily activities that they are perceived as cultural rather than religious. When one inquires why something is done in a specific way, they often reply "this is the way we Chinese do it."

This diffused character of religion, as C. K. Yang (1961) calls it, might explain some paradoxes that occur when surveys dealing with religious issues are carried out among a Chinese population. In the case of Macao, the 1991 census reported that 64

percent of the Chinese population (more precisely those who do not hold a Portuguese passport and are of Chinese origin) answered that they did not have any religion. However mere observation suffices to deny the accuracy of this data. Every little store one enters has a small shrine. We can frequently see people make offerings and burning paper money at the entrances of their houses, major temples are packed with worshippers, and so on. It seemed to me that the results of the census were biased. It was a multiple-choice question; people had to state whether they were Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, "other," or had no religion. I decided to conduct a small survey where two different questions were asked. I interviewed 57 Chinese persons, at random, in the streets of Macao. First, I asked the same question that was raised in the census—"Do you have any religion? (*Néih yáuh móuh jùnggaau seunyéung?*). Though I left it open-ended, 77 percent replied negatively. Then I asked: "Do you have a shrine at home, do you *baai sàhn* (*bai shen*) at home or in the temples?" To which 73 percent replied yes. There are two possible explanations for this apparent paradox. One is that respondents perceive the question "Do you have any religion?" as referring either to a "foreign" religion such as Catholicism, Protestantism or Islam, perhaps also including Buddhism. The majority of worshippers do not consider themselves Buddhists though their religious system integrates aspects of Buddhism. Therefore what they do—*baai sàhn*—according to them does not fit any of these categories, which leads them to argue that they do not have any religion. *Baai sàhn* is not conceived as being religious but rather as an integral part of being Chinese.

James Watson argues (1993) that societies that display a high degree of internal integration achieve cultural unity either by nurturing a unified system of shared beliefs or by following a set of common practices or rites. Societies of the latter type emphasize primarily the performative domain. This seems to have been the case in late imperial China (and still is the case in some rural areas) where the construction of a unified culture relied on nurturing a system of shared rites and where less emphasis was placed on common beliefs. According to Watson: "Orthopraxy (correct practice) reigned over orthodoxy (correct belief) as the principal means of attaining and maintaining cultural unity" (1993:84).

The situation has changed in the P.R.C. and there seems to have been a movement from "orthopraxy" to "orthodoxy," where greater emphasis has been placed on an ideological system of belief. This, though, did not happen in Macao, where people kept their ritual practices. Following Watson's line of thought, we could say that it is the participation in the rituals punctuating people's life that confers, to the Chinese in Macao, their sense of cultural unity. This would explain the general tendency to downplay the relevance of the system of beliefs and concomitantly stress the importance of engaging in ritual practices. It is not so relevant what one believes as long as one participates: "cynics, agnostics, and active non-believers participate in these rites along with those who profess strong faith in the efficacy of the acts. Those who refuse to follow accepted procedure are consciously isolating themselves from the community and hence withdrawing from the dominant culture." (ibid.:88)

The emphasis in the ritual dimension at the expense of the system of beliefs is not a Chinese particularity. As Demerath (1994) argues, we can distinguish between "religions of the word" and "religions of the act." Although Chinese would fit better in the latter label, they are not the only ones. Japanese too tend to place a greater emphasis on a set of common practices and rites rather than in shared beliefs. This, it is important to stress, does not mean that the Japanese or the Chinese lack a shared system of beliefs. We can not say that some cultures are exclusively "ritualistic" or that some exclusively emphasize the "belief" dimension. Religious ideas and practices, in other words belief and ritual, always come together. What is meant is that while some cultures tend to stress the importance of shared beliefs, others lean in the opposite direction, emphasizing the ritual domain.

This dual approach seems to be reflected in peoples discourse on religion, whether they tend to maximize or minimize its importance. If I ask any Portuguese person whether he or she has a religion, the response is most probably affirmative even if this person, though being baptized, has only been once or twice to the church and pays little attention to religious matters. To engage in ritual activities is not perceived as being significant. What is important is that one shares a common set of beliefs. The same would be true of French or even Americans. The result is that although the different Churches in these countries experience a low number of

practicing believers, statistical data suggest the opposite—a high percentage of people declare that they have a religious affilition. This leads us to hold that people affiliated in the so-called "religions of the word" tend to maximize their religiosity while the opposite tendency occurs with those affiliated with "religions of the act."

Some scholars have noted the tendency of the Chinese and Japanese to minimize their religiosity (Watson 1993; Demerath 1994). This tendency to minimize one's religiosity was further demonstrated in my research. Before reading the above cited works, I set out to do research expecting to find empirical support to my hypothesis that religion played an important role in the construction of Chinese ethnic identity. After a few interviews, I was disconcerted by people's answers: "religion is not an important part of Chinese culture," "we come to the temple if we have time, but if we do not come it does not really matter," "I do not know whether the gods respond to our requests, but we might as well try" or "everyone does *baai sàhn*, so I feel that I should do the same." After hearing these kinds of answers, my impression was that I had chosen the wrong subject to research. After all, people's discourse downplayed the relevance of religion, the core of my research. I considered choosing a new subject, but I was intrigued by what at that time seemed the incongruity of people's actions and discourse. They were, in fact, engaging in the ritual practices and simultaneously claiming that these were not that significant.

The analysis of the data collected during the survey conducted in the Kun Iam Temple courtyard confirmed the impression created during the first interviews. A significant percentage of the worshippers (28 percent) strongly argued that religion was not such an important matter. This position was more strongly held by male worshippers (43 percent of the male respondents) than by female ones (only 21 percent of the female respondents shared this opinion). One possible explanation for the latter is that religious activities are frequently delegated to women. They worship not only for the sake of themselves but also for the welfare of the household.

The discrepancy between practice and discourse, the lack of emphasis on systems of belief and doctrines that at first seems paradoxical can only be fully grasped if we put aside our western perception of religion that emphasizes the notion of a shared system of belief. By looking at religion as composed of beliefs and rituals,

each of which are either emphasized or underplayed in different cultural contexts, Chinese religion can be better understood.

There are several cultural features that define the Chinese as Chinese and differentiate them from the "others." Religion, through the engagement in ritual practices is one of them. Those involved have a strong feeling of participating in Chinese culture. As Watson observes: "the process of becoming Chinese involved no conversion to a received dogma, no professions of belief in a creed or set of ideas. One became Chinese, in essence, by acting Chinese, by behaving like Chinese; and perhaps the clearest indicator that this cultural transformation had been accomplished was the performance of key rituals in the accepted manner" (1993:93).

I contend that, in Macao, the engagement of the Chinese population in ritual practices promotes the cohesion of the Chinese community as a whole. I am not implying that individual worshippers engage in those practices with that intention in mind. What I am arguing is that, as Sangren puts it, "primarily, existential and subjective concerns of individual worshippers have the largely unintended sociological effects of reproducing social solidarity and differentiations at local, regional and higher levels of collectivity" (1991:69). In the case of Macao, the sociological effects of one's participation in ritual activities is the expression of Chineseness and simultaneously the definition of boundaries between the Chinese and the other communities in the territory. Both Chinese born in Macao and those who immigrated from the Mainland take part in ritual activities as was previously shown by the percentage of worshippers born in Mainland China that visit the temple. Furthermore, there seems to be a clear perception of the degree of involvement in religious practices by the Mainland Chinese resident in the territory. Fortune-tellers, temple keepers, temple leaders and worshippers born in Macao, all agree that migrants from Mainland China constitute a significant part of the worshippers. Although there is an awareness of subethnic divisions, religion, in Macao, promotes an overarching sense of belongingness to Chinese culture, regardless of divisions based on place of origin, dialect or other features that are commonly drawn upon to legitimize discourses that emphasize distinctiveness. To stress the importance of subethnic groups is only relevant in very specific situations. As we are dealing with a multiethnic context ruled by an ethnic minority, it becomes strategically more

significant to unite under a common category—being Chinese, rather than assume more restricted identities, such as Chinese born in Macao, Fukianese and so on. In this context, religion provides the field where this unity can be expressed.

CONCLUSION

Religion and Ethnic Identity in Macao: Past and Present

In the former chapters I have attempted to demonstrate how different ethnic groups have deployed religion and how the role played by religion has evolved due to political, economic, and social changes. Since the beginning of the Portuguese domination in the territory, the official endorsement of the Catholic Church served the purpose of legitimizing the Portuguese ruling position and therefore reinforcing their power. Portuguese authorities have drawn on religious affiliation to build ethnic boundaries; to be or not to be Christian defined, according to official discourse, one's ethnic identity. In practice, during the period of double sovereignty, the Chinese who converted to Catholicism became subject to Portuguese jurisdiction. This did not imply that they were integrated in the Portuguese community. Although having crossed the ethnic boundary, they constituted a community of their own. A few exceptions were those who, although not integrated with the Portuguese community, were assimilated by the Macanese community due to other assets they possessed. In the seventies, changes in the political scenario led the Portuguese authorities to revise their policy and promote a progressive dissociation from the Church. Today, although the Church is still financially supported by the government—due to the *Padroado* agreement—and it still has some degree of influence in the political sphere, we could say that there has been a gradual secularization of the government. The government has adopted a discourse that emphasizes the citizens of the territory, the people of Macao, rather than one than emphasizes ethnic differentiation.

The late seventies marked the turning point in the Church's posture in Macao. The newly appointed bishop Arquimínio Rodrigues da Costa adopted a more open attitude in conformity with the new direction of the Church established in the Second Vatican Council. He further supported the localization of the Church through the appointment of Chinese priests to some of the parishes and through the suggestion, accepted by the Pope, to have a Chinese nominated as his successor. The process of localization of the Church is being gradually implemented and seems irreversible. Some Chinese priests, concerned about the Church's involvement with the

government, now seek some degree of separation, namely to move off government support and sponsorship, in order to maintain an autonomous voice.

Changes in the posture of the Church towards both the government and the Chinese community and culture have led to changes in the patterns of conversion and its implications. As it was described in chapter three, until a few decades ago Chinese converts were forced to deny their Chineseness, which involved the renunciation of much of what other Chinese regarded as fundamental for their ethnic and cultural identity. They had to display an assimilative attitude towards the values and life-styles of the Portuguese community. To convert implied the adoption of a new ethnic identity. Only in the last decades did conversion start to be socially regarded as the result of an individual option that does not entail the loss of one's ethnic identity.

Changes in the political situation, in the posture of the Church, and the fact that the majority of the Catholic population is now ethnically Chinese makes it no longer possible to draw upon Catholic religion to establish an ethnic boundary between the Portuguese and the Chinese communities. Even the Macanese community whose ethnic identity strongly relied on the promotion of an orthodox Catholicism, in a clear attempt to emphasize their "Portugueseness" and to set themselves apart from the Chinese community, are now drawing on other social markers to promote their distinct ethnic identity.

Catholic religion and Chinese popular religion played distinct roles in ethnic identity. Catholicism was drawn upon to establish a boundary between the Christians and the non-Christians. However, within the community of Catholics, other distinctions between ethnic groups also existed—there were the Portuguese, the Macanese and the so-called new Christians, the Chinese Catholics. Although Catholicism dissociates the latter from the Chinese community as a whole, the Church never implemented a policy that enabled the unification of these groups. On the contrary, ethnic differentiation was reproduced, and in a certain way reinforced, within the Church—there were distinct parishes for each group. Chinese popular religion through ritual practices is, on the other hand, instrumental in the reinforcement of the cohesion of the Chinese community. By enabling the expression of a Chinese identity, it also differentiates Chinese from non-Chinese.

In Macao, the changes in the political and social context led to changes in the role played by the temples. Until the beginning of this century they were the linking element between local Chinese and the Mainland Chinese authorities, therefore contributing to reinforce a natural inclination of the Chinese population to pay allegiance and loyalty to the Chinese Emperor, rather than to the Portuguese government, and to preserve their ties with China. At the local level, temples, besides being religious institutions, had secular functions which led to a consolidation of the neighborhood communities where they were located. This latter role has prevailed until recently, though its significance has definitely decreased since the sixties. Neighborhood affiliations then stopped being relevant. The process of the decreasing significance of neighborhood communities led to a decline of neighborhood temples. Simultaneously, major temples saw their popularity increase becoming symbols of a territory-wide identity.

Religious Policy in the People's Republic of China

A central part of this study consisted in focusing on historical changes and demonstrating how religion is bound to social, cultural, and political processes—how religion affects and is affected by these phenomena. Therefore this study must discuss the major political change that will occur in 1999 (the effects of which are already being felt), and that will greatly affect the role played by both Catholic religion and Chinese popular religion in this territory. On December 20, 1999, Macao will become part of the People's Republic of China with the status of Special Administrative Region. The policy of "one country, two systems" promoted by the Chinese leaders as well as the agreement on the Basic Law presuppose that the policies enforced in the territory will be distinct from the ones applied to the rest of China. In what concerns religious matters, Macao's religious leaders have been reassured several times by members of the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council who are responsible for the implementation of the Chinese Communist Party's religious policy, that no changes will be introduced and the Basic Law will be respected. In agreement with this law, the government of the Macao Special Administrative Region will not interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations and believers as long as these do not contravene the laws of the Region.

During the Mao Zedong era, religion was strongly persecuted. However, since Deng Xiaoping's "open-door" policy, religious activities became relatively tolerated and there was a relaxation of religious control. In 1982, Document No. 19 on the Party's policy on religious affairs was issued. It presents the Party's detailed interpretations on the policy of freedom of religious belief and sets the limits for religious activities, differentiating the "administrative control" of the Religious Affairs Bureau from the strictly religious functions of each organization (Leung 1993:65). This document states that the Party tolerates the existence of religion, concedes to the citizens freedom of internal religious beliefs, but only a certain freedom in their external manifestations. Furthermore, all religious organizations have to be registered and are administrated by patriotic organizations that are under the direct control of the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Department of the United Front.

Another important aspect is that the Party defines what constitutes "legitimate" religious beliefs. "Superstition" is radically distinguished from "religion," the latter referring exclusively to institutionalized religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. Aside from these five beliefs, the Chinese government does not concede either the right to believe or to practice other religions. Chinese popular religion falls under the label of "superstition;" it is considered dangerous to the society and, consequently, is not officially recognized. Some scholars argue that the reason behind the differentiation between popular religion and "normal religious activities" emphasized in the law does not lie in the fact that these behaviors derive from "ignorance" and are "disorganized," as official Chinese discourse claims. According to Feuchtwang and Wang (1991:262), it is precisely the organized aspects of popular ritual activities which may lead popular ritual to run out of the control of official administrative and security organizations, that is considered threatening. Chinese officials are concerned about the risk of "superstition" constituting a means of promotion of illegal counter-revolutionary action.

The spirit of "controlled tolerance" that was the undertone of the Document No. 19 has been recently substituted by a certain degree of ideological intolerance reflected in state interventions whenever the state feels threatened. This has been the case after the events of Tiananmen in 1989. Religious leaders have been arrested, believers persecuted and religious activities reduced. More recently (January 1994),

in order to prevent religion to spin out of official control, the prime minister Li Peng has promulgated new laws that introduce further restrictions on religious activities.

Macao 1999

As mentioned earlier, the religious policy adopted in Mainland China does not, at least according to the Sino-Portuguese treaty, apply to the Macao Special Administrative Region. However, the article 128 of the Basic Law for the M.S.A.R. concerning religious affairs seems too brief, consisting only of three short paragraphs. The way the article was drafted leaves space for different interpretations. Furthermore the statement that the government will not "restrict religious activities which do not contravene the laws of the Region" creates loopholes in the law. The lack of a clear and reassuring legislation contributes to an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty. This was expressed by the different religious leaders that I interviewed. Regardless of their religious affiliation, all agreed that it is not possible to predict what is going to happen after the transfer of sovereignty in 1999.

One aspect of the legislation that I would like to underline is the fact that one out of a total of three paragraphs of the article 128 is exclusively dedicated to financial matters. It states that "religious organizations shall, in accordance to law, enjoy the rights to acquire, use, dispose of and inherit property and the right to receive donations. Their previous property rights and interests shall be protected by law." Although a solid financial situation enables religious organizations to play a more active role, the article also states that these organizations can maintain relations with their counterparts outside Macao which could mean that their financial support may come from abroad. The need felt by the drafting committee to secure their "previous property rights" derives from the awareness that the time of the *laissez-faire* policy implemented by the Portuguese government may be drawing to an end.

Religious leaders voiced their concern regarding two issues related to property rights. First, the fact that the majority of churches and temples are considered patrimony of the territory implies that the government will be able to dispose of them according to its own interests, in other words, they can be expropriated and utilized for non-religious purposes. Second, the fact that a significant percentage of the

properties belonging to religious organizations are not officially registered makes it impossible to prove their ownership. This situation has led, for example, the bishop of Macao to pay particular attention to the financial foundations of the diocese. Some properties have been sold and the money was invested more safely.

The total absence of governmental control of religious activities has enabled one single person to have the monopoly of the profitable temples in Macao. It seems probable that from 1999 onwards some control over temple's activities will be exercised. But how these activities will be regulated and the degree of interference in the management of the temples by Chinese officials is presently unpredictable. It is not possible to foretell what the real impact of the political changes will be, but they could affect the nature of the role played by religion in Macao.

Although I have demonstrated how Catholic religion was deployed to establish ethnic boundaries, and how, on the other hand, Chinese popular religion contributed to reinforce cohesion within the Chinese community, I have also shown that ethnic identities are contextual. This is further confirmed by the fact that while religion has been an important tool to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness in a colonial setting, it will lose its instrumental role with the retrocession of the territory to the PRC; ethnic identities will then be defined in other terms. From 1999 onwards, new ethnic identities will emerge since the "other" by reference to which "one" defines oneself will change. Chinese from Macao, in their attempt to promote a specific identity distinct from the Mainland Chinese, will have to resort to new social markers. The awareness of the risk of being assimilated and of loosing their previous identity has led to a search for a specific "Macao people" identity. The process of peaceful hand-over of Macao (as well as Hong Kong) by a colonial power to another sovereign nation is unique in the world history. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of the population of this territory is Chinese makes it a particularly interesting case to the study of ethnicity dynamics; whether and how the "Macao people" will manage to create their own identity and based on which criteria is something that deserves the attention of social scientists.

NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1. Here I follow the definition of this ethnic group that is provided in the most recent study done on this community. According to João de Pina Cabral and Nelson Lourenço, Macanese (*tóu sàng* in Cantonese) identity is based on three social markers, though the relative significance of each one of them has been changing. Briefly, language (Patois/Portuguese), religion (Catholic) and race (in the sense that the person, or someone in his/her family are the result of miscegenation between a European and an Asian) are the criteria drawn upon to create a Macanese identity. However, any of these social markers on its own can be sufficient for one person to identify himself and be identified by the others as belonging to the Macanese community (see Pina Cabral and Lourenço 1993b).

2. If one particular community differentiates itself from another based exclusively or predominantly in the aspect of religious affiliation, it becomes clear that the only requirement to cross the ethnic boundary relies in the conversion to, or affiliation with, the "other's" religion. Religion, therefore, as a criterion of ethnic differentiation provides the advantage of being more flexible than other aspects such as race, language, or place of origin. These social markers though can also be regarded, in certain contexts, as referring not to objective realities but to cultural constructions that are therefore socially manipulated (see Honig's [1992] study of the Subei people in Shanghai).

3. On religion and ethnicity see also Bowman (1993), Brown (1989), Fenn (1980), Rutledge (1985), and Smith-Hefner (1994).

4. Monsenhor Teixeira has already published more than 120 historical works. In what concerns Macao and its diocese, one major work consisting of sixteen volumes was published between 1940 and 1979.

5. Popular religion refers to a system that blends Buddhism, Taoism, and ancestor worship. This system is characterized by its own forms of expression in cult and worship that centers on family altars and village temples.

6. I take class to mean social differentiation based on political and economic functions and control of resources.

7. Catholicism is the main religion in Portugal. Other religions, such as Protestantism or Islam, are only marginally represented. In Macao, the Protestant Church had great difficulties to establish itself as the Jesuits forbade the Christian community from contact with Protestant priests. It was only in the last decades that this religion has been developing its activities in the territory, but the percentage of Protestants is still quite low (1.7 percent according to the 1991

census). Consequently, when I mention the Church in Macao I am referring to the Catholic Church.

8. Whenever the fragile equilibrium gave way to conflict, the Chinese authorities resorted to suspending the supply of food to the territory therefore neutralizing the power of the Portuguese. This practice became a recurrent and efficient way of assuring that their interests would prevail.

9. It is important to keep in mind that Macanese ethnic identity also relies on other criteria such as language and religion. This was not taken into account in the census and therefore some people considered as Macanese were combined with the Chinese population.

10. "Most Chinese immigrants are economic migrants who are pulled to an overseas destination by the prospects for higher incomes, better jobs opportunities and vocational training. In this respect, they prefer Hong Kong to Macao. Unlike for Hong Kong, China did not set a monthly quota for emigrants to Macao until 1984. Until January 14, 1979, the majority used Macao as a stepping stone to get to Hong Kong; after that date Hong Kong closed its door to Chinese immigrants from Macao except for tourist purposes. . . . Only after 1979 did Macao begin to receive large number of Chinese immigrants in its own right" (Yuan 1993:267).

Notes to Chapter 1

1. According to one of my informants who works for the diocese, the government subsidizes the work of sixty-two missionaries, but presently there are only sixty persons in this position, forty of whom are diocesan priests and the remaining twenty being people working for the congregations. Each one of them receives monthly his *côngrua* (ecclesiastical revenue) that usually varies from grade 100 to 180 (according to the official tablet of salaries—one grade equals to forty-one patacas). It is interesting to note that the bishop's annual income according to the 1952 *Diploma* should equal the one attributed to the highest official, the one just below the governor himself. However, according to the same source this does not apply anymore. It seems that, in a certain sense, he has been demoted to the category of "department head" (*Director de Serviço*). My informant did not know when this change has occurred.

2. It is commonly said that the bishop is selling many of the Church's properties to invest the money abroad, namely in Hong Kong's stock market. He also plans to open a big hotel in Macao and the project has already been approved.

3. There was even one case, that I know of, in which the bishop assumed governmental functions. In 1849 when the governor Ferreira do Amaral was assassinated, a government committee was created and one of its members was the bishop D. Jerónimo José da Mata.

4. The decree concerning religious activities in Macao included in the Basic Law (April 1993), whose final drafter was the bishop of Macao Domingos Lam reads as follows:

> **Article 128**
> The Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region, consistent with the principle of religious freedom, shall not interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations and believers in Macao to maintain and develop relations with their counterparts outside Macao, or restrict religious activities which do not contravene the laws of the Region.
> Religious organizations may, in accordance with the law, run seminaries and other schools, hospitals and welfare institutions and to provide other social services. Schools run by religious organizations may continue to provide religious education, including courses in religion.
> Religious organizations shall, in accordance with law, enjoy the rights to acquire, use, dispose of and inherit property and the right to receive donations. Their previous property rights and interests shall be protected by law.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. It was at this time that the *Nossa Senhora de Fátima* parish was created. This is an eminently Chinese parish since this is an area mainly inhabited by Chinese

2. In reality, it was in 1938 that the Vatican reversed its position concerning the Chinese Rites. However the old stand prevailed in most of Macao's parishes for several decades. Even now two old Portuguese priests interviewed told me that Catholics should not pay respect to the ancestors.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. According to Rubie Watson, "In Chinese society names classify and individuate, they have transformative powers, and they are an important form of self expression" (1986:619). Furthermore, "Names classify people into families, generational sets and kin groups" (ibid.:622). The adoption of western names in present-day Macao and Hong Kong is quite a generalized practice, though these western names are used only in certain situations. However to adopt a western surname is commonly regarded as unthinkable, especially in the case of men. "For Chinese men, names have a transformative power that binds them as individuals to society" (ibid.:629). By adopting a western surname, a man is publicly severing his relations with the community and is regarded as having betrayed his own people as well as his ancestors. In Macao, Chinese converts that adopted a Portuguese name and surname clearly denied their Chinese ethnic identity.

2. It is important to note that many students from Macao have done their undergraduate and graduate studies in Taiwan. Until the seventies the Church was in favor of the maintenance of ties with Taiwan and had established contacts there. Students that had conducted their studies in Chinese, in the schools run by

the Church, and had obtained a scholarship or those that could afford to subsidize their own studies went to Taiwan universities.

3. Portuguese students tend to enroll in the Portuguese public school and then to further their studies in Portugal. There is a special quota in the universities there for students that come from the territory. Since the majority of Chinese parents opt for schools that lecture either in Chinese or English, very exceptionally would a Chinese student choose a Portuguese university to continue his studies.

4. When a Portuguese man married a Chinese woman their children became members of the Macanese community. In Hong Kong the children of inter-ethnic marriages or inter-ethnic sexual relations were regarded as half-cast and considered by the British as belonging to the Chinese community.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. See, for example, letter dating from 1758 published in *Arquivos de Macau*, ser. 3, vol. IV, no. 4, 1965, p. 252.

2. The Chinese Temples Committee allocated surplus funds from the operation of the temples to charity organizations. One of the organizations that received part of those funds was the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, a Chinese institution that played a central social and political role in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Hong Kong. In Macao, the Keng Vu Hospital seems to have played a similar role but never achieved the prominence of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals nor, as far as I could find out, was it directly or indirectly subsidized by the temples.

3. In Macao not only the temple's real estate but also the temples themselves are not registered. I went to the "Lands Department" (*Cartório do Registo Predial*) to inquire whether some temples were registered. I found out that of the four temples I was interested in, Kun Iam Tong, Kun Iam Ku Miu, Ma Kok Miu and Lin Fong Temple, only one, the Kun Iam Ku Miu, was registered. However this temple had only been registered in November of 1993. From what I was told by the leader of the Kun Iam Ku Miu, the reason why the committee of the temple decided to have it registered was that, since the leader of the Kun Iam Tong was getting too powerful, it was afraid that he would attempt to take control of the Kun Iam Ku Miu.

4. According to Reverend Carl Smith, in the middle of the nineteenth century several people in the area of Patane and San Kiu were paying rents to the Kun Iam Tong, Ma Kok Miu and Lin Fong temple.

5. For example, *Macau* magazine (May 1994) published an article on the visit of the Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva to the territory. This article was illustrated with pictures of the Prime Minister in the Kun Iam Temple, surrounded by the governor and the monk that runs the temple (see appendix 4).

6. The variation in the inclusiveness of these committees, can still be clearly seen in the statutes governing specific temple associations that were published during the twenties. For example, the Ma Kok Miu association only accepts as members those who are descendants of the founders of the association while the Kun Iam Ku Miu considers eligible not only those who are descendants of the founders but also those who have resided in the Mong Há neighborhood for more than three years. Nevertheless, members of these committees were commonly prestigious local people who had wealth and influence.

7. Information provided by Reverend Carl Smith.

8. Information provided by Reverend Carl Smith.

9. In Hong Kong these associations existed since the nineteenth century (Sinn 1989). In a first stage they played an important social and political role but saw their power decrease due to the establishment of official structures and officially endorsed institutions, such as the Tung Wah Hospital, that provided similar services (Santos 1991).

10. One of the important activities of the kaifongs was the issuing of documentation. Until the seventies they issued residence and civil status certificates requested by the Chinese authorities. From the eighties onwards the Portuguese authorities took over this activity.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. This temple situated in Mong Há is colloquially known as Hong Kong Miu. There is no relation though with the British territory as the Chinese characters used are different (see glossary).

2. According to the monk Jihk Jaahk, the monastery was built in the Ming dynasty, between the years of 1621 and 1628 (Amaro 1967:361). Some scholars argue that the temple was built in 1627 (Teixeira 1979; Porter 1990).

3. *Wang Xia* is the Pinyin romanization for Mong Há.

4. The main festivities are celebrated on the nineteenth day of the second, sixth and ninth month of the lunar calendar, as well as on the eleventh day of the fourth month.

5. It is interesting to note that neither the Kun Iam Tong, not the Ma Kok Miu nor even the Lin Fong temple are registered in the Lands Department.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. I interviewed six temple keepers from the Kun Iam Tong, Kun Iam Ku Miu and the Lin Fong temple.

2. For an interesting analysis of Chinese female deities see Sangren (1983).

3. Another possible and interesting explanation for the deity's change of sex suggested by Blofeld is that the Chinese combined Avalokitésvara and Tara (revered by Mongols and Tibetans as a female emanation of Avalokitésvara) into a sort of female Avalokitésvara whom they call *Guan Yin* (Kun Iam in Cantonese).

Appendix 1

Map of the Macao Peninsula

Appendix 2

General Characteristics of the Population of Macao

By place of birth



By origin of ascendants



By language spoken at home



Source: Adapted from the results of the 1991 census (Direcção de Serviços de Estatísticas de Macau 1993)

Appendix 3

Visit of the Portuguese Prime Minister to the Kun Iam Tong



Source: Reproduced from the magazine *Macau* (ser. 2, no. 25, May 1994, p. 10)

Appendix 4

Map of the Mong Há Neighborhood



Appendix 5

Plan of the Kun Iam Ku Miu as in 1922



Source: Adapted from Amaro (1967)

This plan shows the projected *Avenida Coronel Mesquita* and the *Rua Madre Terezina* that cut across the large temple courtyard.

Appendix 6

Adjusted Resident Population
Territory of Macao, 1951-1991



Source: Adapted from the results of the 1991 census (Direcção de Serviços de Estatísticas de Macau 1993:table F)

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Registration of the Benevolent Association of the Ma Kok Miu

serviços se encontram centralizados neste Ministério, propondo-se a forma de se proceder ao seu inventário e catalogação.

O Conselho de Ministros, em sua sessão de 19 do corrente mês, aprovou a execução de trabalhos extraordinários durante o prazo de seis meses, na importância de 22.800$, para pagamento dos mesmos serviços a uma comissão composta de três funcionários dos correios e telégrafos coloniais.

Nestes termos e de harmonia com o artigo 22.º da lei de 20 de Março de 1907 e § 1.º do artigo 52.º da lei de 9 de Setembro de 1908, proponho a V. Exa. que os trabalhos extraordinários de que se trata sejam executados durante três horas sucessivas em cada dia e por prazo não superior a cento e oitenta dias.

Os empregados designados para a execução dos trabalhos propostos são os que constam da relação junta.

Concordando V. Exa., poderá lavrar-se o respectivo decreto.

Repartição Central, 21 de Abril de 1926.—Pelo Chefe da Repartição, *António Nuno Ghira.*

Visto.—21-4-19 6.—*Ernesto de Vasconcelos.*

Despacho.—Concordo.—Lisbon, 21-4-1926.—O Ministro, *E. Rocha.*

Relação dos funcionários que deverão prestar serviço extraordinário na Secção dos Correios e Telégrafos do Ministério das Colónias e das importancias que cada um deverá receber por tal serviço.

Pessoal permanente

Chefe de secção:	
Mário Correia Barata da Cruz	7.593$38
Adjunto:	
Luciano Botelho da Costa Martins	6.207$66
Pessoal eventual	
Chefe de serviços telegráficos de Angola:	
Joaquim Rafael dos Santos	8.565$00
	22.376$04

Repartição Central do Ministério das Colónias, 21 de Abril de 1926.—Pelo Chefe da Repartição, *António Nuno Ghira.*

Por decreto de 8 de Maio corrente, visado pelo Conselho Colonial, em 25:

Júlio Eduardo da Rocha Grilo, inspector de 2.ª classe do quadro geral do pessoal superior dos Serviços dos Correios e Telégrafos Coloniais—promovido a inspector de 1.ª classe, para o mesmo quadro, nos termos do n.º 1.º do diploma legislativo colonial n.º 19 (decreto), de 2 de Maio de 1924.

Para ser publicada nos «Boletins Oficiais» de todas as colónias.

Direcção Geral dos Serviços Centrais, 26 de Maio de 1926.—O Director Geral interino, *Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa.*

(Do *Diário do Govêrno* n.º 126, de 31-5-1926, II Série).

GOVÊRNO DA PROVÍNCIA

CONSELHO LEGISLATIVO

Nos termos do artigo 25.º do decreto n.º 7:030, de 16 de Outubro de 1920, se publica o seguinte:

Proposta n.º 20

O Conselho Legislativo aprovou e o Governador da Colónia de Macau dá o seu assentimento a êste diploma, que entra imediatamente em vigor, nos termos do n.º 2.º da secção 1.ª da base 30.ª da Administração Civil e Financeira das Colónias:

Artigo 1.º É prorrogado por mais um ano, a contar do dia 1 de Julho do corrente ano, o prazo fixado no artigo 1.º do diploma legislativo n.º 5, de 9 de Janeiro de 1924, para admissão do pessoal eventual a que o mesmo artigo se refere, nas precisas condições que no mesmo diploma se estabeleceram.

Art. 2.º Fica revogada a disposição em contrário.

Secretaria do Conselho Legislativo da Província de Macau, 17 de Julho de 1926.— O Secretário do Conselho, *Paulino António da Silva.*

SECRETARIA GERAL DO GOVÊRNO

Portarias

N.º 112-A.—O Governador da Província de Macau, ouvido o Conselho Executivo, aprova os Estatutos da Associação de Piedade e de Beneficência «Cheng-kuoc-sim-lam», mais conhecida por «Ma-kuoc-mio» ou «Ma-cho-kuoc», que baixam assinados pelo Secretário Geral do Govêrno e fazem parte integrante desta portaria.

Cumpra-se.

Palácio do Govêrno em Macau, 7 de Julho de 1926.—O Governador, *Manuel Firmino de Almeida Maia Magalhães.*

Estatutos da Associação de Piedade e de Beneficencia denominada «Cheng-kuoc-sim-lam» (正覺禪林) mais conhecida por «Ma-kuoc-mio» (媽閣廟) ou «Ma-cho-kuoc» (媽祖閣)

Artigo 1.º Pelos presentes estatutos é legalizada a situação da sociedade de beneficência denominada «Cheng-kuoc-sim-lam» (正覺禪林) mais conhecida por «Ma-kuoc-mio» (媽閣廟) ou «Ma-cho-kuoc» (媽祖閣) fundada há mais de três séculos no tempo do imperador da China Man-lik da dinastia *Meng* pelos negociantes naturais de Chiong-chao, Chin-chao e Chio-chao, aqui residentes.

Art. 2.º Esta associação tem a sua sede no pagode da Barra desta cidade e possue fundos próprios que consistem em propriedades imobiliárias doadas pelos seus fundadores.

Art. 3.º O fim da associação é venerar o Buda, exercer o seu culto, fazer a propaganda de boas doutrinas, praticar a caridade e manter uma escola para os pobres. Para êste fim se destinam os rendimentos dos bens que lhe pertencem.

Art. 4.º Constituem também encargo da associação as despesas com a conservação e manutenção do templo, pagamento de décimas e outros impostos ao Estado.

Art. 5.º Só podem ser sócios desta Associação os descendentes dos fundadores que como tais se inscreverem.

§ 1.º Foram sócios fundadores desta Associação: Chié-foc-heng —Seac-soi-lao — Iao-cheng-kong — Vong-ün-hi — Choi-veng-chip — O-peng-cheong aliás O-hi — Li-kong-mão — Lao-cheong-an — Teng-kong-san — Vong-sio-van — Sam-vun-man — Lam-baú-liu —Iao-pac-hoi — Sam-veng-hin — Choi-veng-ki aliás Choi-va-chio —Ngan-kong-chim — Vong-cheong-sao — Vong-pou-tio — O-ki-chiong — Chan-ün-vo — Lam-chio — Ngan-sam-iao — Sam-veng-ioc aliás Sam-vong — Cheng-kai-vu — Ng-si-chio — Teng-san-

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Registration of the Benevolent Association of the Ma Kok Miu

-neng — Chan-chan — Veng-cheong-nin — Sam-tin-fu — Chan-chan-kong — Iao-seng-chi — Ngan-ung-chiong — Tu-hi-vo — Chao-chie-i — Chan-chec-foc — Chan-lap-tac — Chan-mi-sang e Lu-seng-lon.

Art. 6.º Será elaborado um regulamento interno, no qual serão definidas as obrigações e direitos dos sócios, regulamento êste que não poderá em nenhuma das suas disposições contrariar o que se acha disposto nos presentes estatutos.

Art. 7.º A associação será administrada por uma comissão directora composta de um presidente, um vice-presidente, um tesoureiro e dois secretários, em cuja guarda ficarão os documentos da associação.

Art. 8.º A comissão directora será eleita bienalmente em assemblea geral dos sócios da associação.

Art. 9.º A assemblea geral reünir-se-ha em sessão ordinária annualmente no primeiro ou segundo mês segundo o calendário chinês, para apreciar as contas da administração da comissão directora.

Estas contas serão apresentadas em forma de conta corrente — Niu-kit —, onde virá discriminada a receita e a despesa.

Art. 10.º A associação nomeará um bonzo do pagode «Kun-iam-tong» de Mong-Há, para dirigir os serviços do culto e cuidar da conservação do templo, o qual terá de respeitar os regulamentos da associação, podendo qualquer sócio, na hipótese de êle se conduzir por forma censurável, apresentar queixa fundamentada à comissão directora, que o substituirá se assim o entender por outro da sua escolha.

Art. 11.º Ao bonzo encarregado do pagode é defeso admitir qualquer pessoa para viver no edifício do templo.

Art. 12.º Os sócios da associação tem o direito de fazer as suas reüniões no edifício do templo todas as vezes que o entender.

Art. 13.º Para que as resoluções da comissão directora sejam válidas é necessário que estejam presentes três ou mais membros. Os que faltarem à sessão terão que se submeter à deliberação da maioria dos que estiveram presentes.

Art. 14.º O *quorum* para as reüniões da assemblea geral é de sete sócios, não podendo a assemblea reünir-se válidamente com um número inferior. Os sócios que não estiverem presentes às respectivas reüniões de assemblea geral terão que se submeter à decisão da maioria.

Art. 15.º A associação fica sujeita às leis em vigor na colónia de Macau quanto ao regimen da propriedade e aquisição de bens.

Secretaria Geral do Govêrno em Macau, 7 de Julho de 1926. — O Secretário Geral do Govêrno, *Manuel José de Menezes Fernandes Costa.*

(Custo desta publicação $7,80)

N.º 117. — O Governador da Província de Macau, atendendo ao que requeren o condutor de 1.ª classe do quadro geral permanente das Obras Públicas das Colónias, aguardando aposentação, Manuel Início de Rezende, pedindo a liquidação do seu tempo de serviço prestado ao Estado, nos termos do determinado no ofício n.º 652, de 15 de Maio do corrente ano, da Direcção Geral dos Serviços Centrais para êste Govêrno, isto é, para efeitos de aposentação, declara que, em face dos documentos juntos ao respectivo processo de aposentação e conforme o mapa que abaixo segue, conta o requerente, para os efeitos do disposto no decreto n.º 5:824, de 31 de Maio de 1919, 26 anos e 137 dias; para os efeitos do disposto no decreto n.º 5:823, daquela mesma data, 21 anos e 308 dias; e para os efeitos do disposto nos decretos n.ºs 5:834, também da mesma data, e 7:639, de 30 de Junho de 1921, 22 anos e 113 dias.

Liquidação	Parciais Anos	Parciais Dias	Totais Anos	Totais Dias
Na Metrópole				
Como aluno dos Correios e Telégrafos, subsidiado pelo Estado, de Outubro de 1888 a Junho de 1891	2	273		
Como praça do Corpo de Alunos da Armada (ajudante ou aspirante maquinista naval), de 29-10-891 a 3-11-893	2	6	4	279
Em S. Tomé				
Como auxiliar da Direcção das Obras Públicas, de 11-11-901 a 1-10-902	—	325		
Como condutor interino da mesma Direcção, de 2-10-902 a 27-5-903	—	238		
Como condutor de 1.ª classe idem, de 29-3-913 a 22-10-913 e de 25-6-914 a 21-5-916	2	175	4	8
Em Angola				
Como agrimensor auxiliar provisório, de 8-7-903 a 16-2-908	4	224		
Como condutor de 1.ª classe da Direcção das Obras Públicas, de 28-10-913 a 11-5-914	—	201	5	60
Em Timor				
Como condutor de 2.ª classe da Direcção das Obras Públicas, de 9-1-912 a 28-3-913	1	79		
Como chefe dos serviços das Obras Públicas, de 22-5-916 a 31-7-919	3	71		
Como condutor de 1.ª classe da mesma Direcção, de 16-6-920 a 2-4-922	1	291	6	76
Em Macau				
Como condutor auxiliar da Direcção das Obras Públicas, de 17-2-908 a 25-6-910 e de 17-11-911 a 25-12-911	2	169		
Como encarregado da mesma Direcção, de 26-6-910 a 16-11-911	1	144		
Como condutor de 2.ª classe idem, de 26-12-910 a 8-1-912	—	14		
Como condutor de 1.ª classe idem, de 1-8-919 a 15-6-920 e de 3-4-922 a 14-4-925	3	332	7	294
SOMA			27	352
A deduzir:				
Para os efeitos do disposto no decreto n.º 5:824, de 31 de Maio de 1919, ⅓ do tempo de serviço metropolitano, nos termos do art.º 3.º do decreto n.º 5:734, de 10-5-919	—	—	1	215
Para os efeitos do disposto nos decretos n.ºs 5:834, de 31-5-919, e n.º 7:639, de 30-7-921 — ½ do tempo de serviço metropolitano	3	61		
O tempo de serviço como auxiliar da Direcção das Obras Públicas de S. Tomé e Príncipe	—	325	4	24
RESULTADO			22	113
Para os efeitos do disposto no decreto n.º 5:823, de 31-5-919: Tempo total do serviço prestado ao Estado, como atrás se contou	—	—	27	352
A deduzir:				
⅓ do tempo de serviço metropolitano, nos termos do art.º 3.º do decreto n.º 5:734, de 10-5-919	1	215		
½ do tempo de serviço prestado nas colónias da Africa, estabelecendo a sua equivalência com o do tempo de serviço prestado nas colónias asiáticas, nos termos do decreto de 20-9-906	1	194	3	44
TOTAL			24	308

Cumpra-se.

Palácio do Govêrno em Macau, 8 de Julho de 1926. — *Manuel Firmino de Almeida Maia Magalhães.*

(Foi pago o sêlo devido).

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Registration of the Benevolent Association of the Kun Iam Ku Miu

de aposentação, até 31 de Agosto findo, 22 anos e 180 dias de serviço, conforme o mapa que abaixo segue:

Liquidação	Anos	Dias
Tempo de serviço prestado na colónia de Timor, liquidado por P. P. n.º 223, de 31-12-1923, da mesma colónia	11	10
Tempo de serviço prestado na colónia da Guiné, liquidado por P. P. n.º 172-B, de 1-10-1925, da mesma colónia	2	8
Embarcou da colónia da Guiné para esta Colónia em 1-10-1925, no gôzo da licença graciosa, conservando-se nesta situação até 10-11-1926	1	41
Como 2.º oficial contratado, servin nos Correios e Telégrafos desta colónia, desde 11-11-1926 até 31 de Agosto de 1928..	1	295
SOMA.....	15	354
A adicionar, nos termos do parágrafo único do artigo 1.º do decreto n.º 5:823, de 31 de Maio de 1919, e do artigo 5.º do decreto de 20 de Setembro de 1906, a equivalência do tempo de serviço prestado nas colónias de Timor e da Guiné para esta colónia	6	191
TOTAL.....	22	180

Cumpra-se.

Palácio do Govêrno em Macau, 12 de Setembro de 1928.

O Governador,

Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa.

(Foi pago o sêlo devido).

N.º 179

O Governador de Macau, ouvida a secção permanente do Conselho do Govêrno, aprova os Estatutos da Associação «Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio», que baixam assinados pelo Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil e fazem parte integrante desta portaria.

Cumpra-se.

Palácio do Govêrno em Macau, 17 de Setembro de 1928.

O Governador,

Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa.

Estatutos da Associação de piedade e de beneficência denominada «Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio» (觀音古廟)

Artigo 1.º Pelos presentes estatutos é legalizada a situação da igreja ou pagode Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio (觀音古廟) que existe em Macau na povoação de Mong-Há há mais de cinqüenta anos.

Art. 2.º Tal igreja ou pagode é transformada numa associação de piedade e beneficência com igual denominação: Kun-Iam-Ku-Mio (觀音古廟).

Art. 3.º O fim desta associação é venerar o Buda, exercer o seu culto, aconselhar o bem, cultivar a moral e praticar actos de beneficência.

Art. 4.º Só podem fazer parte da supradita associação os descendentes dos fundadores da referida igreja ou pagode e os individuos que tenham mais de três anos de residência na povoação de Mong-Há.

§ 1.º Os fundadores da mencionada igreja ou pagode forum: Chio-Van-Kunn,—Vong-Vai-Fun,—Chan-Iun-Leong,—Chio-Chong-Cheong, — Ho-Iec-Iong, — Chiang-Seng-Choi, — Chio-Cheng-Vai, — Ho-Veng-Fai, — Ho-Veng-Chau, — Ho-Keng-Fai, — Ho-Iec-Kong, — Ho-Keng-Cham, — Chan-Sio-Cheong, — Chan-Man-Ian, — Sam-Veng-Chan, — Sam-Veng-Iec, — Sam-Tong-Chan, — Sam-Chak-Tong, — Sam-Chak-Ieng, — Sam-Chak-Fong, — Sam-Chi-Un, — Ho-Iek-Vo e Ho-Cheng-Che.

Art. 5.º A associação será administrada por uma comissão de cinco membros eleitos anualmente pelos sócios entre si sendo um presidente, um secretário, um tesoureiro e dois vogais.

§ único. No impedimento do presidente as suas funções serão exercidas pelo secretário.

Art. 6.º A comissão directora prestará annualmente conta detalhada e documentada da sua administração.

Art. 7.º A comissão directora terá de submeter as contas da sua administração à aprovação dos sócios reünidos em assembléa geral até quinze dias depois de findo o seu exercício.

Art. 8.º Os rendimentos da associação serão empregues no exercício do culto do Buda dentro da associação e em obras de beneficência.

Art. 9.º A associação fica sujeita a lei portuguesa quanto ao regimen da propriedade e aquisição de bens.

Art. 10.º Os casos não previstos nestes estatutos e que a êle não sejam contrários serão resolvidos pela assemblea geral dos sócios.

Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil em Macau, 17 de Setembro de 1928.—O Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil, *João Pereira de Magalhães.*

(Custo desta publicação $1.32)

N.º 180

Tendo Li-hoi-ch'io, proprietário de um terreno com a área de 397 m²,57, situado junto da Calçada de S. Miguel, requerido que lhe fôsse cedido por troca do referido terreno um talhão de terreno situado junto da mesma rua e pertencente ao Estado, com a área de 372m²,00;

Reconhecendo-se ser vantajosa aos interêsses do Estado a troca pedida, tanto mais que, segundo o novo plano de arruamentos, últimamente aprovado para a parte Norte da cidade, deverá ser utilizado para abertura duma nova via pública, uma parte dêsse terreno com a área de 360m²,82;

O Governador da Colónia de Macau, ouvidas a Comissão de Terras e a Secção Permanente do Conselho do Govêrno, concede, nos termos do artigo 9.º do regulamento para a concessão de terrenos da província de Macau, aprovado pelo diploma legislativo provincial n.º 18, de 19 de Maio último, a troca pedida por *Li-hoi-ch'io* do seu terreno com a área de 397m²,57, situado junto da Calçada de S. Miguel e constante da planta junta ao respectivo processo, por um talhão de terreno situado junto da mesma Calçada e pertencente ao Estado, com a área de 372m²,00.

Cumpra-se.

Palácio do Govêrno em Macau, 19 de Setembro de 1928.

O Governador,

Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa.

Appendix 9

Conservatória do Registo Predial

Registration of the Kun Iam Ku Miu

LIVRO

PÁG: 1

Nº 22008 (B115, 110) Apresentação nº 2 de 29/11/1993 G117,59V,116131,AQUI,T

NATUREZA: Urbano G25M,152,3796,AQUI

FREGUESIA: N.SENHORA DE FÁTIMA

DENOMINAÇÃO: PAGODE KUN IAM KU MIO

SITUAÇÃO --

S/N,AVENIDA DO CORONEL MESQUITA

SE - PROPRIEDADE Nº42 DA AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA

SW - AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA

NW - Nº46 DA MESMA AVENIDA E ENCOSTA DA COLINA DE MONG HA

NE - ENCOSTA DA COLINA DE MONG HÁ

ÁREA TOTAL: 1510.0000 mq ÁREA COBERTA: 586.0000 mq

ÁREA DESCOBERTA: 924.0000 mq

MATRIZ: artigo nº 003576

VALOR: $40,000.00

O CONSERVADOR: FRANCISCO CRUZ MARTINS DAVID

*** AVERBAMENTOS ***

Apresentação nº 2 de 29/11/1993

Nº 1

RECTIFICAÇÃO DA ÁREA DE 1870 PARA 1510 M2.

PLANTA Nº3446/91 DE 1992/03/20.

O CONSERVADOR: FRANCISCO CRUZ MARTINS DAVID

----------*** FIM ***----------

CRP M/4

Appendix 9

Conservatória do Registo Predial

Registration of the Kun Iam Ku Miu

LIVRO

(G)	INSCRIÇÕES E AVERBAMENTOS	PÁG: 1

Apresentação nº 2 de 29/11/1993 Inscrição nº 3796 (Lº G25M fls. 152)

SUJEITO(S) ACTIVO(S):

DENOMINAÇÃO: ASSOCIAÇÃO DE PIEDADE E BENEFICÉNCIA KUN-IAM-KU-MIO

Sede: AVENIDA CORONEL MESQUITA,PAGODE KUN IAM KU MIO,MACAU.

PRÉDIO(S):

22008 (LºB115 fls. 110)

Facto inscrito: AQUISIÇÃO

Causa: USUCAPIÃO

Valor: $40,000.00 MOP

Documentos: ESCRIT.7/2/66,FLS.37 Lº 31B DO 2º CN E DE
RECT.23/9/93,FLS.88 Lº71D DO 1º CN.

O Conservador: FRANCISCO CRUZ MARTINS DAVID

----------*** FIM ***----------

Appendix 10

Questionnaire - Kun Iam Tong

Date: Day of the week: Time of the day:

1. How often and in which occasions do you come to the temple?

2. Do you come to the temple alone or accompanied? With whom?

3. Do your family members also come to the temple? How often, in what occasions?

4. Reasons for coming to the temple?

5. To whom do you pray? what do you pray for?

6. What kind of help does the Goddess provide?

7. What does Kun Yam teach ? (general knowledge about this Goddess)

8. Why did you choose this temple?

9. Do you go to other temples in Macau? Which temples? How often? Why?

10. Have you ever been to a Catholic church? If yes, in what occasions? Is any member of your family Catholic?

11. Where were you born? [If not born in Macau] When did you come to Macau?

Residence:
Profession:
Sex:
Age:

Appendix 10

問卷
觀音堂

日期：　　星期：　　時間：

1. 何時和何情況會到觀音堂？
2. 自己獨自前往觀音堂或與別人一起前往？與誰？
3. 閣下的家庭成員也會到觀音堂嗎？何時？在什麼情況？
4. 到觀音堂的因由？
5. 向誰祈求禱告？祈求禱告什麼？
6. 該神會給予什麼幫助？
7. 觀音的教義是什麼？〔閣下對觀音的認識〕
8. 爲何選擇到這觀音堂來？
9. 會到澳門其他的寺廟嗎？什麼寺廟？何時？爲何？
10. 曾到過天主教教堂去嗎？如有，在何情況？閣下的家庭成員中有天主教徒嗎？
11. 閣下在哪裏出生？〔倘不屬在澳門出生的情況〕何時到澳門來？

住址：
職業：
性別：
年齡：

Appendix 11

Survey conducted in the Kun Iam Tong

Age of worshippers



Frequency of visit

Hong Kong Wong Tai Sin (1989)
Number of visits per year



Macau Kun Yam Tong (1994)



Source: Adapted from Lang, Graeme and Ragvald, Lars (1993) for Wong Tai Sin temple
From own survey conducted in November 1994 for Macao's Kun Iam Tong

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GLOSSARY

A Mà	阿媽
Baai sàhn	拜神
Chìng Mìhng	清明
Chòih Sàhn	財神
Chùhng Yèuhng	重陽
Hong Kong Miu (*)	康公廟
Jihk Jaahk	植澤
Jiu rou heshang (Md)	酒肉和尙
Kangxi (Md)	康熙
Kei Tai Si (*)	機大師
Keng Vu (*)	鏡湖
Kun Iam Ku Miu (*)	觀音古廟
Kun Iam Tong (*)	觀音堂
Lin Fong Miu (*)	蓮峰廟
Ma Kok Miu (*)	媽閣廟
Màhn Móuh Miuh	文武廟
Mong Há (*)	望廈
Néih yáu móu jùnggaau seunyéuhng	你有冇宗教信仰
Ou Mun Iaht Bou (*)	澳門日報
P' ou Tchai Sin Ün	普濟禪院
Qianlong (Md)	乾隆
Sám Kái Hui (*)	三街會
Sing mou (*)	聖母
Xinhua She (Md)	新華社
Tìn Hauh	天后
Tóu Sàng	土生
Va Kio (*)	華僑
Zongjiao(Md)	宗教

Note: (*) terms where local romanization was used
(Md) terms where Pinyin romanization was used